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The Belgrade coup d’état against the regime of the Regent, 
Prince Paul, has been examined in a variety of ways: 
(i) from the Yugoslav angle – examining how much 
the March coup was ‘a home grown affair’;1 
(ii) by looking at British-Yugoslav relations from a 
bilateral diplomatic standpoint, or as part of a broad 
comparative study of British policy in South-Eastern 
Europe;2 
(iii) by examining Special Operations Executive 
(SOE) and the British input into the coup itself – 
what one might term its ‘micro-management’ – to 
attempt to allocate responsibility within the British 
political community in Belgrade;3 
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1 See Frank Littlefield: Germany and Yugoslavia, 1933-41, The German Conquest 
of Yugoslavia (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1988); J. B. Hoptner: 
Yugoslavia in Crisis 1934-41 (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1962); 
Dragisa Ristic: The Yugoslav Revolution of 1941 (Philadelphia, PA: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1966). 
2 Mark Wheeler: Britain and the Struggle for Yugoslavia 1940-43 (New York, NY: 
Columbia University Press, New York, 1980); Elizabeth Barker: British Policy 
in South Eastern Europe in the Second World War (London: Macmillan, 1976).  
3 David Stafford: ‘Britain and the Belgrade Coup’, Slavonic Review, (1977) Vol. 
36, No. 3, pp.399-419; Stafford, Britain and European Resistance Movements 
(London: Macmillan, 1980). See M. R. D. Foot: SOE An Outline History of the 
Special Operations Executive 1940-46 (London: BBC, 1984); Stafford, ‘The 
Detonator Concept: British Strategy, SOE and European Resistance After the 
Fall of France’, Journal of Contemporary History, Vol.10, No.2 (1975), pp.185-217.  
(iv) from the point of view of the relative impact on 
German strategic planning – evaluating whether the 
coup did indeed crucially delay Operation 
Barbarossa.4  
The aim of this article is to refine the existing historiographical 
debate, by placing the coup in the broader context of the 
formulation, execution and evolution of British policy towards 
Yugoslavia between the outbreak of the Second World War 
and the coup d’état on 27 March 1941. The events in Belgrade 
were seen as, and presented as, a remarkable propaganda 
victory for the British cause. The coup proved a tremendous, if 
ephemeral, boost to British morale, coming rapidly upon the 
victories against Italian forces in North Africa and The Sudan. 
Even provincial British papers printed the news from 
Belgrade as their banner headline.5 Prime Minister Churchill, 
above all, understood the value of gesture, and the coup was 
perceived as giving Nazism a bloody nose. Hugh Dalton, the 
Minister of Economic Warfare, in London, certainly basked in 
the reflected glory of his department’s perceived 
contribution.6 It was a much-needed fillip to the ‘upstart’ 
service Special Operations Executive [SOE] created by Dalton, 
 
4 See Martin van Creveld, ‘The German Attack on the USSR: Destruction of a 
Legend’ in European Studies Review, Vol. 2, No. 1 (Jan. 1972); and Creveld, 
Hitler’s Strategy 1940-41: The Balkan Clue (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1973); Basil Liddell Hart: The History of the Second World War (London: 
Cassell, 1971), p.132. Also Dusan Biber: ‘The Yugoslav Coup d’État, 27 March 
1941’ in John Erickson and David Dilks (eds), Barbarossa: The Axis and the Allies 
(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1994), pp.34-42. 
5 For example, The Bournemouth Daily Echo and The Bournemouth Times and 
Directory, 28 Mar. 1941. I am grateful to Heather Williams, author of 
Parachutes, Patriots and Partisans: The Special Operations Executive and Yugoslavia 
1941-45 (Hurst & Company, London 2003), for this point. 
6 Hugh Dalton, The Fateful Years Memoirs 1931-45 (London: Frederick Muller, 
1957); see also Ben Pimlott, Hugh Dalton (London: Jonathan Cape, 1985). 
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and precisely the sort of spectacular ‘window dressing’ that he 
craved.7  
The synthesis of published material points to the 
inevitability of a coup in late-March 1941, given the strength of 
feeling within Yugoslavia. Even though the events in Belgrade 
were not just the product of British intrigue, the enduring 
myth is that the coup was a triumph for Britain. Certainly, it 
appears that Britain provided important encouragement and 
support.8 However, examination of the files at The National 
Archives at Kew, private papers and memoir literature points 
to the reality of the inconsistencies and paradoxes of British 
policy towards Yugoslavia before March 1941, and underlines 
the fact that the British endorsement of the coup was born of 
the failure of Britain’s attempts to construct a Balkan front to 
withstand Axis encroachment. Therefore, the coup was indeed 
a crucial propaganda victory for the Allied cause – and Britain 
thereby succeeded in Churchill’s aim of ‘drawing Yugoslavia 
into the war anyhow’.9 However, for Britain the road to the 
coup was much bumpier than has been appreciated hitherto; 
indeed, British policy towards Yugoslavia between 1939 and 
1941 can best be summed up as following the law of 
unintended consequences. 
 This article points to three main aspects of British 
policy towards, and activity in, Yugoslavia. Firstly, the severe 
constraints imposed on UK aims in Yugoslavia by British 
overall policy, its formulation and management. It was not 
                                                 
simply that Britain operated at a fundamental strategic, 
economic and political disadvantage in the country, given 
German economic domination, political influence and 
infiltration by the Axis, and Yugoslavia’s increasing 
encirclement. In addition, there was, of course, also the reality 
of the UK’s severely limited military resources which 
hampered attempts to bolster the Yugoslav General Staff’s 
resolve. It appears that the inherent contradictions of the sum 
of British overall policy conspired to limit even further British 
influence in that country between 1939 and 1941: that is, to a 
degree, these disadvantages were also self-inflicted. British 
policy towards Yugoslavia can best be characterised as 
fragmented, inconsistent, indeed paradoxical.  
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 Secondly, Section D/Special Operations Executive10 
developed wider contacts within Yugoslav society than has 
been credited in the current historiography. But, although 
these contacts were more extensive than has been appreciated, 
they did not comprise greater leverage in Yugoslav politics. 
Not only was the UK one of several great powers seeking to 
extend its influence in Yugoslavia, SOE activities also 
exacerbated tensions with the British Legation in Belgrade and 
the Minister, Ronald I. Campbell. 
 Thirdly, Yugoslavia became crucial to British 
planning only by accident and oversight. The documents 
pointed to British efforts to bring all possible diplomatic 
means and political pressure to bear on Yugoslavia in 
February and March 1941. But this constituted an increasingly 
desperate attempt to salvage something from the wreckage of 
Anthony Eden’s pursuit and London’s vested hopes of a 
Balkan front. Thus, the British decision to support a coup at the 
7 See The National Archives, Kew [hereafter TNA] PRO HS5/166, George 
Taylor Report to Dalton, 26 Feb. 1941. 
8 Hoptner, pp. 253-6; Littlefield, pp.131-6. Hugh Seton-Watson: Eastern Europe 
between the Wars 1918-1941 (London: Archon Books, 1962). Basil Sweet-Escott: 
Baker Street Irregular (London: Methuen, 1965), p.63. TNA PRO HS5/938, 
‘Some Notes on Yugoslav Politics since 27 March 1941’, unsigned report, 10 
June 1941. 
 
10 As it became after July 1940, with merger of Military Intelligence (Research) 
(MI(R)), Electra House, and Section D. 9 TNA PRO PREM 3/510/11, Churchill to Eden, 22 Mar. 1941. 
 3
eJournal of International History (March 2005) 
end of March should be seen as a product of the paradoxes in 
British policy and the failure of her political ambitions in the 
region, together with the power-political gamble of her 
decision to intervene in Greece.  
 There is a further paradox. From the available 
material it appears that Britain’s encouragement, from the 
Legation, SIS (Special Intelligence Service) and SOE, was an 
important psychological prop to the putsch. But, by the same 
token, British activity in support of certain factions within 
Yugoslav politics and society inadvertently contributed to the 
destruction of London’s hopes post-coup – namely, of 
Yugoslavia abandoning the policy of self-defence and 
attacking Italian forces in Albania. SOE operatives in Zagreb 
had recognised British political failings in Yugoslavia and the 
dangers of the choice of focussing on Belgrade and the Serbs, 
particularly the Serbian Peasant Party [SPP].11 The coup 
‘misfired’ in terms of British expectations and British policy 
had contributed to this outcome. In one sense only was British 
policy successful: the coup was seen as defiance of the Axis 
and did indeed precipitate a German invasion of the country, 
as Britain had foreseen – but this German attack took place 
before Britain had had the opportunity of fortifying her 
position in Greece.12 Finally, George Taylor (the Australian 
deputy to Sir Frank Nelson, head of SO2 [Special Operations] 
in London) wrote to Dalton in April 1941, commenting that at 
least Britain would have excellent contacts with post-war 
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Yugoslav politicians: as matters transpired, this, of course, 
proved to be flawed reasoning also. Overall, therefore, it was 
a highly qualified triumph for Britain. 
 
Paradoxes of British Policy 
British policy towards Yugoslavia, particularly between June 
1940 and March 1941, was profoundly confused in practice. In 
her survey of British policy in South Eastern Europe, Elizabeth 
Barker pointed briefly to inconsistencies and ‘the lack of any 
top-level decision on priorities’. However, she concluded, 
‘given human fallibility this was perhaps no great loss’.13 The 
pressures of war, manpower shortages, and the variety of 
government agencies involved are partial explanations. More 
cogent reasons include personal antipathies, political coteries, 
bureaucratic squabbles within departments, competing 
Government departments, each with its individual agenda, 
together with the overriding goal of defeating Germany at all 
costs.14 This meant that the variety of departments and actors 
involved in Yugoslavia worked at cross-purposes, and 
unwittingly conspired to limit further British material 
influence in Yugoslavia. This was on top of the disadvantages 
of Yugoslavia’s strategic isolation, and economic dependence 
upon the Reich, and Britain’s own inability to provide the 
armaments Yugoslavia desperately craved.15  
 
13 Barker, p. 46. 
14 Kenneth Young (ed.), The Diaries of Sir Robert Bruce-Lockhart, Vol. II (London: 
Macmillan, 1980) pp.73-5, 85; Lord Gladwyn, The Memoirs of Lord Gladwyn 
(London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1972) pp.102-3. 11 See TNA PRO HS5/935, NERO Report on SO2 Activities in NW Yugoslavia, 
27 Sept. 1941, 27 Sept. 1941; TNA PRO HS5/912, ‘Report by Lieutenant Glen 
on his Relations with Yugoslavs’, 17 Nov. 1941. 
15 With the Italian invasion of Albania, and German infiltration into Hungary, 
Yugoslavia faced potential enemies on five of her seven borders. Italy’s 
declaration of war on Britain and France in June 1940 turned the Adriatic into 
an Italian lake. After the fall of France in June 1940, Britain’s economic 
position in Yugoslavia looked even more perilous: a mere 4% of Yugoslav 
overall trade. See also Wheeler, p.246. TNA PRO FO371/30259 R3212/G, CAS 
12 TNA PRO  FO371/30252 R2854/G, Campbell for Secretary of State, No. 654, 
21 Mar. 1941. Campbell recognised this danger, and warned Eden that it was 
‘among the factors to be taken into consideration’. See TNA PRO FO371/30253 
R2854/G, Belgrade to Eden, Cairo Tel. No. 171, 21 Mar. 1941. 
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The strategic and economic disadvantages Britain 
faced were not the only handicaps. The British Broadcasting 
Corporation [BBC] was the prime means whereby the UK 
could communicate with the broader Yugoslav population 
and foster the spirit of resistance to Axis encroachment.16 
However, the story of the BBC in Yugoslavia before April 1941 
was not an unalloyed success: it was limited by shortage of 
announcers and translators in London, as well as the number 
of radios per capita in the Yugoslav population.17 Most of the 
short-wave receivers were in cities, and Germany regularly 
jammed two of the three bands used. Also Germany 
possessed important advantages in medium-wave 
broadcasting: the occupation of Austria, Czechoslovakia and 
Poland increased the number of ‘conveniently placed’ stations 
at her disposal, for transmission and jamming.18  
 The totality of British policy, as practised in 
Yugoslavia, compounded these handicaps. The irony is that 
the UK did not suffer from lack of information about 
Yugoslavia: she possessed sound intelligence and good links 
with ruling circles and the Yugoslav service departments. The 
Section D/SOE and SIS networks were more extensive than 
historians have charted. Certainly, the Foreign Office’s and 
Legation’s reliance on the Yugoslav small governing elite was 
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symptomatic of Britain’s own governing elite - this was still 
‘the world of the magic circle’ in England. It was also a 
function of Britain’s imperial outlook and practice. But 
knowledge of Yugoslav economic, political and military 
limitations did not lead to any modification or fine tuning of 
British overall policy: this was naturally dictated by the 
exigencies of fighting Germany and, from June 1940, Italy. 
Britain viewed Yugoslavia as part of the Balkan jigsaw, 
through the lens of British regional strategic imperatives. This 
imposed important constraints on British policy formulation 
towards Yugoslavia.  Preoccupations in the War Cabinet, the 
Chiefs of Staff Committee, the Joint Planning Committee, the 
upper echelons of the Foreign Office and the Southern 
Department, the Ministry of Economic Warfare, the War 
Office and Air Ministry, the Ministry of Information, and even 
the Colonial Office meant all departments demonstrated 
institutional resistance to cool consideration of Yugoslav 
factors and interests.19 Despite structures of co-ordination 
through key committees, with hindsight there appears to be 
fragmentation and lack of cohesion of British policy, 
combined with personal prejudice at critical junctures.  
 What were these inconsistent attitudes and policy 
goals practised by rival departments, which further narrowed 
British options? Firstly, within the Foreign Office in London: 
despite the upsurge in interest in Yugoslavia since 1939, there 
remained a hangover of the implicit assumption of the inter-
(41) 97, 28 Mar. 1941, ‘Committee for the Co-ordination of Allied Supplies. 
Yugoslavia: Statement of British Aircraft and Equipment supplied and 
quantities outstanding against previous releases. 1939-40.’ 
 16 BBC Written Archives Centre, Caversham Park [hereafter BBC WAC] 
E2/206/1 Foreign General, European Service File 1A, 1940, ‘The European 
Services: Proposal for Development of European Departments’, 3 Aug. 1940. 
19 TNA PRO FO371/20534 R/8664/G, Dixon, 30 Nov. 1940. In response to a 
lengthy telegram from the Military Attaché in Belgrade reporting 
Yugoslavia’s increasingly precarious strategic position and her war plans, 
Pierson Dixon of the Southern Department minuted that the report ‘confirms 
our supposition that political decisions will militate against the adoption of 
the right strategic plan in the event of invasion, i.e. the abandonment of 
Croatia and withdrawal to old Serbia.’ 
17 Estimated 1:65. Vladimir Dedijer: The History of Yugoslavia (New York, NY: 
McGraw-Hill, 1974), p.558. 
18 BBC WAC E2/186/4, Foreign General: European Intelligence Papers. 
Intelligence Reports: Europe File 2B Nov. 1940 – Jan. 1941, ‘The Transmitter 
War in Europe, 18.2.41, Supplement to Survey of European Audiences.’ 
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war period that Yugoslavia was a Balkan backwater. This only 
began to change after the capitulation of France in June 1940, 
and particularly with the Italian attack on Greece in October 
1940, paralleled by growing German pressure on Romania 
and Bulgaria. In part this view was a function of geographic 
distance and isolation from London.20 The Foreign Office’s 
interest in Yugoslavia before June 1940 was as part of a 
neutral Balkan front (to deter any rash French projects of 
launching a Salonika front, as had been done in 1918). 
Thereafter, despite talk of ‘setting Europe ablaze’, or 
entangling Russia and Germany in the Balkans, the official 
approach was to avoid any premature explosion in the region, 
and to nurture the existing regime’s pursuit of neutrality.21 
This began to shift from November 1940 given the growing 
British concern at German pressure on Yugoslavia to join the 
Tripartite Pact. From this point, neutrality was no longer 
enough. 
 The Foreign Office’s support for the neutral stance of 
Prince Paul’s regime in practice clashed with the Ministry of 
Economic Warfare’s pursuit of economic blockade of the 
German Reich; the British establishment believed that 
economic stranglehold would bring the inherent weaknesses 
of the Reich to the fore and it would collapse from within, 
with the minimum of material expenditure by Britain. This 
meant denying the export to Yugoslavia of any goods that 
could potentially  be siphoned off to the benefit of the German 
economy. Great pains were taken with the policy of pre-
emptive purchasing, to deny vital foodstuffs and strategic 
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minerals to Germany.22 Britain sought to use the 1940 Anglo-
Yugoslav Payments Agreement and denial of ‘navicerts’ 
(certificates of passage) as additional economic levers. 
However, the Treasury could be counted on to oppose the use 
of adequate sums to ensure any degree of success in the pre-
emptive purchasing scheme.23 Similarly, the Board of Trade 
refused to interfere with ‘the liberty of private traders’ to 
encourage Yugoslav purchase of British manufactured 
goods.24 
 Barker has argued that diplomatic considerations took 
precedence over the goals of the Ministry of Economic 
Warfare. This was not the case in Yugoslavia. The resident 
Minister, Ronald Campbell, was alive to the political damage 
to the British cause that ruthless application of the economic 
blockade would cause, and regularly petitioned London to 
consider the suitability of this policy. However, the Ministry 
of Economic Warfare remained obdurate, backed by the 
Ministry of Information who used the BBC to ‘sell’ the British 
blockade to the enemy occupied and neutral countries. 
The blockade might well be too costly to Britain if 
it were to cost her every friend in Europe, and 
whatever broadcasting can do to make peoples 
and governments endure shortage without asking 
 
22 See, for example, TNA PRO FO371/25028 R6988, G P L Rose minute, 13 
Aug. 1940; R7304/G, FO Tel. No. 473 to Belgrade, 24 Sept. 1940. 
23 Barker, p.31.  
24 TNA PRO FO371/25027 R5423/G, Shuckburgh file note, 29 Sept. 1940. ‘This 
is … typical of our war effort.’ Vernon Bartlett, MP, put down a Parliamentary 
Question on 25 April 1940 asking why there was no British exhibitor at 
Zagrebski Zbor, the most important trade fair in Yugoslavia. Of 180 
exhibitors, 120 of these were German. The Board of Trade had merely made a 
small announcement in its internal journal. 
20 The diplomatic bag took up to three weeks to reach London; and after the 
Italian declaration of war on Britain and France in June 1940, the provision 
route was round the Cape of Good Hope. 
21 TNA PRO FO371/24890 R6449/G, Nichols file note, 15 June 1940; R6703/G, 
Halifax to South Europe posts, Circular No. 126, 5 July 1940. 
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for concessions is a direct addition to Britain’s 
fighting strength.25 
The paradox borne of this fixation on the ultimate benefits of 
economic blockade can be seen when compared to the 
pressing need for re-equipment of the Yugoslav Army. The 
War Office and Southern Department were well aware of the 
deficiencies of the Yugoslav forces. Under the leadership of Sir 
John Shea, MI(R) had conducted an extensive survey into the 
capabilities and requirements of the Yugoslav Army in 
December 1939. But Britain could not provide the armaments 
persistently requested by the Yugoslav Government.26 The 
principal need was for anti-aircraft guns, anti-tank weapons 
and tanks. Much to the embarrassment of the Southern 
Department, the provision of £750,000 credit to Yugoslavia for 
armament purchases could not be taken up by British 
production.27 UK failings were shown in sharper relief after 
the capitulation of France, Yugoslavia’s traditional great 
power ally, and the loss of French war materiel. Two instances 
reveal the damaging nature of this policy when ruthlessly 
applied in Yugoslavia, seen in the apparently banal example 
of tyres and petrol. The Belgrade Military Attaché’s office 
reported that satisfactory and rapid mobilisation of the 
Yugoslav Army required the provision of some 12,000 tyres. 
The Ministry of Economic Warfare objected as rubber was a 
scarce commodity in Germany and was determined to deny 
this; however, as ‘a political gesture’ some 650 tyres were 
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sanctioned for delivery (that is, sufficient for approximately 
180 vehicles, or 5 per cent of the required consignment).28 
Similarly, the British Air Attaché in Belgrade reported that the 
Yugoslav Air Force only had sufficient aviation fuel for a two–
week conflict, and applied for provision from Britain’s Middle 
Eastern supply. The Petroleum Department were able to 
arrange for the supply of this oil, but the Ministry of Economic 
Warfare objected, arguing that Yugoslavia already had 
enough for its peacetime needs; and that it was dangerous to 
accumulate stocks in Salonika, given the vulnerability of the 
port to German attack. If war erupted, then Britain would 
review whether to provide additional fuel from her Middle 
East store.29 Therefore attempts by the Foreign Office to set up 
the rapid supply of aviation fuel and lubricating oil ran into 
the bureaucratic sand. The tale was the same over explosives: 
Britain herself faced a shortage, but was determined that 
Germany should be denied all possible stocks. London was 
prepared to grant a token amount of explosives and raw 
materials which, it was hoped, would reap political benefits 
 
28 TNA PRO FO371/30227 R1649/343/G, Supply of arms and war materials to 
Yugoslavia, 18 Feb. 1941. 
TNA PRO FO371/30227 R686/G, Military Attaché, Belgrade to War Office, Tel. 
No. 00027, cipher 25/1, 25 Jan. 1941. This telegram demonstrated Clarke’s keen 
realisation of the poor state of mechanisation of the Yugoslav Army, pointing 
out that on mobilisation all motor vehicles in the country would be 
commandeered; however, at least 30% were unserviceable from a military 
point of view. Campbell later telegraphed London estimating that nearly 
20,000 tyres would be needed to refit all Army motor vehicles. R686/G, 
Campbell to London, no 174, 4 Feb. 1941. On 26 Feb. 1941 the Ministry of 
Economic Warfare finally authorised shipment of 12,126 tyres on the SS 
Bosiljka from New York. These of course had not reached Yugoslavia before 
the German attack on 6 April 1941.  
25 BBC WAC E2/186/4, Foreign General: European Intelligence papers. Europe 
File 2B, Monthly Intelligence Report: Europe. Summary and Conclusions of 
the Monthly Surveys of European Audiences, 25 Mar. 1941. 
26 See TNA PRO FO371/30227 R1649/343G, Supply of arms and war materials 
to Yugoslavia, 18 Feb. 1941. 29 TNA PRO FO371/20534 R8321/G, Belgrade to London, Tel. No. 882, 7 Nov. 
1940. See also TNA PRO FO371/30227 R1737/G, Sargent file note 5 Mar. 1941. 
TNA PRO FO371/30227 R1649/G, Supply of Arms, 18 Feb. 1941. 
27 TNA PRO FO371/25024 R5983/G, Talbot Price to Broad, 24 May 1940; 
R5993/G, From Nichols to Campbell, 8 May 1940. 
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‘help stiffen Yugoslav resistance’ and Turco-Yugoslav co-
operation.30 
 The files demonstrate a sharp differentiation between 
the War Office’s and the Foreign Office’s assessment of 
Yugoslav capabilities, and their enduring faith in Serbian 
resolve. London possessed detailed knowledge of the 
shortcomings of the Yugoslav Army in terms of military 
personnel, armaments and strategic plans, etc. The extensive 
survey carried out by Shea’s MI(R) mission of December 1939 
was supplemented by a further report from the Belgrade 
Military Attaché, forwarded by Campbell to Lord Halifax, the 
Foreign Secretary, in November 1940. This report pointed to 
the preferable strategic plan of retreating to defend Old 
Serbia, but recognised that this would not be accepted because 
of its political ramifications. After the dismissal of General 
Nesic as Chief of Staff, Clarke reported to London that there 
was no change in Yugoslav strategic planning: it remained 
focussed on total peripheral defence.31 Campbell accepted that 
there was only very limited pressure Britain could bring to 
bear on the Yugoslav Government for change, and he was 
very reluctant to advise the Regent on this. This point was 
totally overlooked in the War Cabinet and Foreign Office in 
March 1941. These Departments appear to have fallen prey to 
their propaganda that the Yugoslav Army was the best in the 
Balkans – this was not a competitive field – and the enduring 
faith in ‘gallant little Serbia’. Indeed, Clarke’s report had 
concluded that, despite the deficiencies of the Yugoslav Army, 
Britain could rely on the traditional fighting spirit of the Serb 
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nation. Therefore, despite the reports of equipment 
deficiencies, the knowledge of Yugoslav strategic planning, 
London’s awareness of the strain of mobilisation on the 
Yugoslav economy, in March 1941 the British demanded a 
Yugoslav volte-face to an offensive strategy. The political 
preoccupations of London civil servants and politicians meant 
that they lost sight of logistical realities.  
In brief summary, there is no appearance of high-level 
adjudication between diplomatic, military and economic 
priorities. The implementation of these myriad policies served 
to limit British influence, and conspire to narrow further her 
options. This underlined reliance on the British Legation in 
Belgrade, and Section D/SOE in the country. 
 
SOE in Yugoslavia 
Here too, British policy was working at cross-purposes. In the 
struggle for Yugoslavia between 1939 and 1941, as Elizabeth 
Barker has pointed out, Britain believed that she had several 
promising, if intangible assets. In addition to the conviction of 
the animosity of sections of Yugoslav society to German and 
Italian encroachment and London’s enduring confidence in 
‘the traditional fighting spirit of the Serb nation’, there were 
also the more concrete advantages. First there was the British 
Legation and its contacts within Yugoslav Government. 
Above all, London’s hopes resided in the anglophile, Oxford-
educated Regent, Prince Paul, friend and relation of the British 
establishment, confidant of the British Ambassador, ‘Our 
Friend’ in the telegraphic correspondence from Belgrade. The 
belief endured up to mid-March 1941 (20 March for the 
Minister and Legation; 24 March for Eden) that Prince Paul 
represented Britain’s trump card. With the continued 
suspension of parliamentary democracy dating back to 1929, 
Yugoslavia was under a quasi-dictatorship. London expected 
30 TNA PRO FO371/30227 R1649/G, Supply of Arms, 18 Feb. 1941. 
31 TNA PRO FO371/25027 R4906/G, Captain Davies, 12 Dec. 1939. 
FO371/25034 R8664/G, from Military Attaché, Belgrade,  Despatch No 220, 13 
Nov. 1940. Also, R8611/G Naval Attaché, Belgrade,  to London, Tel Nos. 220 
and 223, of 12 and 13 Nov. 1940. 
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Paul to behave like an autocrat, and to think like an 
Englishman – despite the overwhelming body of evidence that 
Paul took his custodial tasks as Regent as his guiding 
principles, not adherence to British interests.32 The importance 
attached to Prince Paul was shown in the Ambassador’s and 
Southern Department’s requests for King George VI to write 
bracing letters to bolster the Regent’s resolve: ‘regal 
evangelism’33 and monarchical solidarity were offered as 
political and psychological substitutes for military hardware. 
Beyond the Prince, the Legation enjoyed excellent 
links with a small circle within the Yugoslav governing elite. 
The Ambassador drew upon three to four sources; the 
Legation as a whole regularly cited information from 
approximately ten. These contacts were within the Yugoslav 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Yugoslav consuls in 
Berlin and Rome.34 The Shadow missions enjoyed good links 
with the Yugoslav General Staff, Army and Air Force.35 SIS 
also had established excellent networks of information and 
intelligence gathering throughout the country, using vice-
consular and pro-consular cover in Zagreb, Split, Dubrovnik, 
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Susak, Llubljana and Skopje.36 Then there was the ‘upstart’ 
organisation, Section D/SOE whose interests and activities 
were in principle, and often in practice, diametrically opposed 
to the Minister Ronald Campbell’s determination to support 
Prince Paul and Yugoslav strict neutrality; and SIS desire for 
tranquillity to ensure nothing interfered with the gathering of 
intelligence.37 In reality, the greater tension arose between the 
Legation and Section D/SOE: the Stephen Clissold papers at 
the Bodleian Library show that in Yugoslavia at least there 
was remarkable co-operation and concord between SOE and 
SIS before April 1941.38 
A considerable amount has already been written on 
Section D/SOE in Yugoslavia before 1941, pointing to its 
propaganda work (the establishment and financial support of 
the Britanova news-agency, and the Britannia publication), as 
well as the systematic bribery of newspaper editors and 
political subversion; sabotage of Axis economic interests and 
strategic communications, through ambitious schemes to 
block Danube river traffic, thus denying the German war 
economy precious shipments of Romanian oil and wheat; and 
post-occupational planning for resistance and wireless 
networks.39 SOE’s contacts and activities in Yugoslavia went 
beyond this, and were more wide ranging than has been 32 Robert Rhodes James (ed.), Chips. The Diaries of Sir Henry Channon (London: 
Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1967) p. 285. 
 33 Wheeler, pp.19-22. 
36 See TNA PRO FO The Foreign Office List 1939, 1940 and 1941. Reference 
351.10.25. 
34 Southern Department were regularly irritated by Campbell’s convoluted 
system to protect the identity of his sources, and tried to persuade him to use 
a system of code words. However, as Pierson Dixon pointed out, Campbell 
was not even consistent in this as he ‘would then let the cat out of the bag.’ 
(TNA PRO FO371/30225 R296/G, Dixon file note, 9 Jan. 1941.) Subsequently a 
list was drawn up using alphabetical codes. 
37 Sweet-Escott, p.24;Gladwyn Memoirs, p.106. 
38 Stephen Clissold Papers, Bodleian Library, Oxford, [hereafter Clissold 
Papers] MS Eng.C2683, see AC Lawrenson (D/H6) Report, 12 June 1945, 
London, ff/12-23. Also To AD from D/H6, Note on the Death of GS Frodsham, 
5 June 1945. 35 See TNA PRO HS5/912, Glen Report, 17 Nov. 1941. German pressure on the 
Yugoslav Government curtailed Alexander Glen’s weekly contacts with the 
Yugoslav military in the autumn of 1940. The resumption of these meetings 
was taken by Southern Department in the Foreign Office as an indication of a 
stiffening of Yugoslav resolve against German encroachment. 
39 See Julian Amery, Approach March: An Adventure In Autobiography (London: 
Hutchinson, 1973), p.171. TNA PRO HS5/204, SOE Danube River No 4, 20 
Nov. 1940 and TNA PRO HS5/166, Philip Broad memorandum, 20 Mar. 1941. 
Also Barker, Wheeler and Stafford, ‘SOE and Belgrade coup’. 
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appreciated hitherto. Lord Amery commented in 1991 when 
on a visit to Yugoslavia, ‘[T]here is stuff in the British archives 
that would make your hair stand on end.’ Much of the 
original SOE material has been lost.40 However, from 
memoirs, private papers, and a religious trawl through 
Foreign Office, War Office, Air Ministry, Cabinet, and PREM 
papers, it is possible to build up a more complete picture of 
this SOE network which was deemed to be the most 
promising in the Balkans, and which appeared to offer the 
advantages of a substantial base for subversive activity in 
neighbouring countries.  
 One aspect which must be stressed in any 
examination of SOE behaviour in the Balkans is the marked 
‘imperial’ approach evident in SOE’s dealings with their local 
contacts. Few UK personnel were needed: the collusion of the 
key members of the local population, directed by British 
operatives, was the means to further British strategic 
planning. In the mindset of the time considerable potential 
was attached to apparently insignificant numbers and limited 
contacts, especially by Dalton. SOE was at pains to try and 
establish links with all elements of the fragmented Yugoslav 
political spectrum, and Yugoslav society. However, as shall be 
seen, despite these attempts, the prime focus of the 
organisation’s activity came to rest on a small element within 
the Serbian political spectrum which ultimately proved to be 
counter-productive in terms of satisfying British strategic and 
military objectives. 
 Deakin, in The Embattled Mountain, stressed British 
links with Yugoslav personalities and associations was 
exclusively Serb, nationalist and conservative in politics: 
                                                 
‘[T]here were few similar contacts in other parts of 
Yugoslavia, though certain relations had been established 
with patriotic organisations in Slovenia’.41 Certainly, by early 
1941, SOE was working ‘very closely’ with the Slovene 
Democratic Party led by Dr Cok and Professor Rudolph. SOE 
acknowledged that Cok’s party, although the largest Slovene 
political party, enjoyed only a very small following, so did not 
exploit its contacts for political purposes. The SOE’s view of 
the value of these Slovenes lay in their highly organised 
underground network and considerable experience in 
conspiratorial work. Yet another advantage of links with this 
small political party was its lines of communication with the 
Slovenes in Istria, (on the Italian border), and in Austria. In 
the eyes of SOE, this underground resistance had already 
proved its worth in small-scale acts of sabotage (such as 
destruction of rail freight and transports, attacks on 
warehouses and factories) as well as distributing British-
produced propaganda against German influence in 
Yugoslavia itself. However, London was doubtful of this 
group’s capabilities in regard to guerrilla warfare and 
destruction of infrastructure.  
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 In addition to these demolition squads, SOE had also 
established contact with a loose organisation of Slovene 
irredentists, led by Dr Brezigar, who was also Editor-in-Chief 
of the Slovene liberal newspaper, Jutro. This group included 
exiled Czechs with experience of underground resistance and 
also, but only a few, Croats.42 The greatest advantage in 
 
41 Frederick Deakin, The Embattled Mountain (London: Oxford University 
Press, 1971), p.124. 
42 Through Terence Glanville (code name NERO), Lawrenson and McRogers 
who formed a ‘triumvirate’ working in the north, SOE established a small 
network of Croatian-sponsored saboteurs and organisations, using Slovene, 
Croatian and Czech agents. The Slovene head, Medven, organised teams of 
40 Between 85%-87%, through poor filing, injudicious shredding, a convenient 
fire at Headquarters, unsystematic post-war culling of remaining material. 
See Introduction to The National Archives, HS5 series. 
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Branko’s organisation lay in its network of communications 
with other opponents of fascism in Hungary, Bohemia and 
Moravia, and in Austria. At the encouragement of SOE, 
Brezigar’s organisation was in touch with Cok’s group and 
both promised stout resistance to possible German attack and 
occupation. 
 There were other aspects of economic sabotage which 
Dalton valued highly in terms of propaganda value and 
maintaining resistance to fascism.43 It must be said that this 
remained small-scale, and amateurish. However, it went 
further than the sabotage of antimony mines, to rail shipments 
of oil and coal, and the sinking of Italian shipping. Dr Alfred 
Becker,44 a German Jew and Section D employee, attempted on 
at least one occasion to infect Yugoslav livestock bound for 
Germany with foot and mouth. Unfortunately the plan 
backfired when herds in the Yugoslav side of the frontier 
became infected instead.45 Alan Lawrenson, the SOE officer 
responsible for Northern Yugoslavia, also learned that 
Brezigar’s group was using British funds to finance the 
group’s attempts to spread anthrax in cattle shipments to 
Germany and Austria. Lawrenson was not ‘at any very great 
pains to discourage Brezigar’s activities – more especially as to 
do so would have certainly taken the edge off his keenness in 
other respects.’ 46 In November 1940, a memorandum entitled 
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‘Functions and Organisation of D Section of Yugoslavia’ 
effectively condoned such activity, as it noted 
[P]oisoning water supplies, spreading bacteria 
and similar sabotage is ruled out, but introduction 
of foot and mouth disease, potato pests etc, are 
encouraged and naturally any attacks on 
communications, power stations or centres of 
production of important manufacturers.47  
The Croat community presented more of an obstacle to SOE’s 
agenda. The leader of the Croatian Independent Democrats, 
Dr Srdjan Budisavlevic, was a firm friend of Alexander Glen, 
and this Party also received a British subsidy from January 
1941.48 The Party was deemed particularly useful in its 
determination to forge a bridge between the Serbian and 
Croatian communities. Attempts were made to establish 
communication with Dr Wilder’s Croat Democratic 
Organisation, deemed to be valuable from a political 
standpoint. Through the Roman Catholic Bishop of Sibenik, 
who was judged ‘a good friend to Britain’, SOE maintained 
links with the small Andjolinovic Party, based in Split.49 
Overall, these small units appeared more promising from the 
point of view of launching occasional small- scale sabotage, 
rather than political influence. They also provided a good 
network of intelligence in Slovenia, Dalmatia, Croatia, 
Herzogovina and Bosnia.50 SOE also had links with ‘odd 
groups of communists in Croatia and Slovenia’ who carried 
out small-scale sabotage, intelligence gathering and 
propaganda; however, ‘SO2 never discovered the names of 
communists and democrats in various parts of the country to carry out small 
scale industrial sabotage. TNA PRO HS5/166, Report on SO Organisation and 
Plans in the Balkans, Most Secret SC/44/12 Attachment. Taylor to Dalton, 26 
Feb. 1941.   
43 TNA PRO HS5/166, Dalton to Churchill, 7 Mar. 1941. 47 Ibid. 
44 Amery, Autobiography, p.168. Becker was obliged to leave Yugoslavia in 
June 1940 with Julius Hanau and William (‘Bill’) Hudson 
48 No record survives of the start date of this financial support, nor of the 
sums involved. 
45 Clissold Papers, MS Eng C2683, A. Lawrenson Report, 12 June 1945. 49 TNA PRO HS5/935, NERO Report, 27 Sept. 1941. 
46 Ibid. 50 TNA PRO HS 5/912, Copy file, C General Information, 14 Aug. 1941. 
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the leaders.’51 Julian Amery had put out feelers to the 
proscribed Yugoslav Communist Party, which was well-
organised with ‘apparently a large following in the schools 
and universities’. There was a difference of view among SOE 
personnel as to the value of this link. Writing in late 1941, 
Glen dismissed them as ‘many [being] doubtless only 
enthusiastic youths, or the more disgruntled graduates turned 
out each year to find that the learned professions were already 
overcrowded.’52 Similarly, SOE neglected the Bosnian Moslem 
Party (by Glen’s own admission). It was felt that this political 
party was more interested in ‘the promotion of the interests of 
its adherents and apparently took little interest in foreign 
affairs.’ The fact that the British Consulate in Sarajevo closed 
in early 1940 is indicative of London and the Belgrade 
Legation’s lack of attention. 
 Terence Glanville (the SOE officer based in the 
Consulate in Zagreb) also developed links with the United 
Jugoslavs, an influential organisation of businessmen which 
formed the commercial and financial backbone of the country. 
Its members included a considerable number of Jews and 
many Christians. Its youth organisation, the Organisation of 
United Jugoslav students, printed and circulated propaganda 
for SOE. SOE specifically made use of Shell Company, Cunard 
White Star and Canadian Pacific. Ivan Ivanovic, the director of 
the Yugoslav Lloyds Shipping Company in Susak, was a 
known sympathiser of the British cause. SOE also maintained 
good contacts with the Croatian Trades Unions (CTU) – a 
‘powerful movement’ comprised of employees of private 
enterprises in Croatia. The movement generally, as well as its 
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newspaper, Pravica, was funded by SO2. Glanville knew the 
CTU leader, Basic, whom he regarded as ‘a stout fellow’.53 
 Of the Croatian political parties, the Croatian Peasant 
Party [CPP] was the most important, and represented the 
greatest challenge. SOE recognised the Party as being 
‘extremely well-organised, and with its influence extending 
deep into the lives of the people’ – through propaganda, 
cultural and welfare activities in the villages, financing of 
agriculture and application of science, as well as its militia and 
armed guards.54 In view of Glanville, the CPP was ‘the only 
well organised and statesmanlike political party in 
Yugoslavia.’55 Much to the suspicion of the Italian agents, the 
British Consul in Zagreb, Terence Rapp, hosted a fish and chip 
supper each Friday at Gaspic or Zenica for leading members 
of the Croatian Peasant Party and the Croat Independent 
Democrats.56 However, the focus of British political activity 
and attention, both SOE and the Legation, was primarily on 
Belgrade. By his own admission, Glen only met 
representatives of the Croatian Peasant party ‘on a few 
occasions, and [could] not claim any personal knowledge of 
them, except Dr Shutej and Emoljan.’57 Attempts to foster 
British influence and consequent unified Yugoslav resistance 
to German political infiltration and economic domination 
 
53 TNA PRO HS5/935, NERO Report, 27 Sept. 1941. 
54 TNA PRO HS5/912, Report by Glen, 17 Nov. 1941. 
55 TNA PRO HS5/965, NERO Report on SO2 activities in NW Yugoslavia, 27 
Sept. 1941. 
56 TNA PRO HS5/965, debriefing report by DH/4 on his questioning by Agents 
of the Counter-Espionage Department of the Italian Minister of War. 51 TNA PRO HS5/935, NERO Report, 27 Sept. 1941. 
52 TNA PRO HS5/912, Report by Lieutenant Glen on his relations with 
Yugoslavs, 17 Nov. 1941. 
57 TNA PRO HS5/912 Report by Lieutenant Glen on his Relations with 
Yugoslavs, 17 Nov. 1941.  
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encountered the obdurate realities of Yugoslav politics.58 As 
successive reports from the Consulate in Zagreb confirmed, 
the Sporazum of 1939 had done nothing to mitigate enduring 
suspicions between the Serb and Croatian communities. 
London was repeatedly informed that different historical 
experience, religious attitudes and cultural influences 
rendered the Croat community more hostile to Italian 
ambitions than to growing German influence. 
 Therefore British attempts to infiltrate and second 
Croats were limited by the Croatian suspicions of Serb-
dominated Yugoslav foreign policy, and hampered by the 
pervasive attitude that German influence would be less 
pernicious than Italian encroachment. British attitudes seem 
also to have been coloured by the conviction of their Serb 
contacts that ‘Croatia should be considered lost ‘59 However, 
SOE still managed to maintain contact with a number of Croat 
military officers; the news that they were in touch with ‘the 
major commanding the Sapper battalion which [was] 
responsible for demolition along the frontier, especially the 
bridges over the river’ was of particular interest to London, 
and the reports that junior and middle-ranking officers were 
more robust in their opposition to Germany, and more 
inclined to take a strong stand than the generals and 
politicians in Belgrade.’60 The files also point to a possible link 
between SOE agents and the Zagreb head of police, Vikert.61 
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 SOE links with the Jewish community in Yugoslavia 
are harder to chart.62 Although there remains no hard 
evidence in the Yugoslav country files for SOE and the 
Foreign Office, there are indications in the other SOE country 
files in the Balkans (particularly Romania, Bulgaria and 
Turkey). With hindsight it seemed likely that the Yugoslav 
Jewish community would have been potential natural allies of 
the British war effort leading up to 1941.63 However, as SOE 
had discovered in its attempts to recruit Romanian Jews in its 
Danube schemes, this was not necessarily the case and local 
Jews were ‘afraid to compromise themselves by engaging in 
belligerent activities’.64 Given that Germany and German-
occupied Europe controlled almost the totality of trade with 
Yugoslavia, and the prominence of the Jewish community in 
the banking and commercial sector of the Yugoslav economy, 
there was a powerful disincentive. However, Peter Boughey, 
SOE agent in charge of financial transactions in Belgrade, was 
particularly effective in securing favourable rates for British 
pounds on the black market in his project of building up a 
local currency war chest, and considerable sums of money 
ended up in the Anglo-Palestine Bank in Tel Aviv.65  
 Elizabeth Barker states that the scheme proposed by 
Chaim Weizmann, President of World Zionist Organisation 
and President of the Jewish Agency, in 1940 to use Jewish 
Haganah personnel to help with the sabotage plans for the 
 
62 Amery points to Jakob Altmaier and Alfred Becker’s contribution to SOE 
activities in 1939-40. See Amery, Autobiography, p.168. 
63 See Paul Benjamin Gordiejew: Voices of Yugoslav Jewry (Albany, NY: State 
University of New York Press, 1999). 
58 See entire file TNA PRO FO371/30211 ‘Yugoslav-German Permanent 
Economic Commission’ for details of German economic links with Yugoslavia 
between 1940 and 1941. 64 TNA PRO HS5/195, ‘Report 15.4.41, dictated by W H Burland, signed T F 
Walton’. 59 TNA PRO HS5/938, Weekly report, 22 Oct. 1940, AH/G to DH2 . 
60 TNA PRO HS5/166, George Taylor report, 26 Feb. 1941. 65 See entire file TNA PRO HS5/177 ‘SOE Bulgaria’ for further details of these 
transactions. 61 See TNA PRO HS5/912, Copy File, 14 Aug. 1941 C. General Information.  
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Romanian oil fields was nipped in the bud.66 This is not the 
case. Both Sweet-Escott and Amery point to SOE using the 
Jewish Agency’s illegal visa network in Central and Eastern 
Europe for their sabotage network in August 1940.67 This link 
was clearly well-established by January 1941, when SOE 
prepared a paper on the assistance which SOE should be able 
to call upon from other departments in pursuit of its plans to 
destroy Romanian oil shipments: this should include ‘the 
same Foreign office, Home Office and Colonial Office facilities 
in the way of passports, travelling documents and visas for 
our (Yugoslav) associates as in the case of Roumania [sic]’.68 
(At the time SOE was also proposing to establish a centre in 
Palestine ‘from which our friends whom we are evacuating 
from the occupied and likely to be occupied Balkan countries 
can work back into this area’.69 This led SOE into direct 
conflict to the Colonial Office’s determination to limit 
immigration into Palestine, and determination to stop all 
illegal immigrants.)70 In January 1941 the Bucharest Legation 
sent a series of urgent telegrams to London requesting 
authorisation for transit papers and visas for 51 Jews (the list 
comprised Romanians, two Poles and one German Jew); the 
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Colonial Office erupted as the list included two known visa 
traffickers and others who were known or suspected to have 
purchased illegal visas.71 SOE was summoned to a meeting 
with the Deputy Under-Secretary at the Colonial Office. The 
upshot was a diktat that on no account were subsequent SOE 
applications for emergency transit papers from the Balkans to 
include Jews. 
 The other tantalising reference in the documents 
refers to Section D/SOE attempts to use the Yugoslav 
Freemason network and contacts as a means of augmenting 
British influence. This idea emanated from the Foreign Office 
in the summer of 1940, and was passed on to the new SOE 
organisation. The Freemasons formed the backbone of the 
Serbian business community and had prominent political 
overtones; the network was also prominently represented in 
the Civil Service and the Orthodox Church.72 However, it is 
impossible to evaluate the importance of these links – under 
German pressure, the Masonic lodges closed down in July 
1940. Germany had complained that they represented the 
centres of British intrigue and anti-German activity; this 
echoed German policy to close Masonic lodges in other 
occupied countries (for example, in the Netherlands) at the 
same time.73 66 Barker, p.36. 
 However, while these SOE contacts were more 
extensive than previously detailed, this was not translated 
into important and controlling influence. SOE officers in 
Yugoslavia regarded SOE’s failure to develop an effective 
infiltration programme within the Croat community as an 
67 Sweet-Escott, p.26 and Amery, Autobiography, p.189. The Jewish Agency 
used Romanian shipping from the Danubian ports, and Greek shipping. 
Foreign Relations of the United States [hereafter FRUS], 1940, Vol. III, Consul 
General at Jerusalem to Secretary of State, 24 Jan. 1940. 
68 TNA PRO CAB 80/56/COS (41)3(0) ‘Interference with German Oil Supplies’, 
Memorandum by the Special Operations Executive. The prime route for Jews 
fleeing fascism was through Romania and Greece. The pre-war Jewish 
population in Yugoslavia had swelled to 85,000 (from 71,000), but at present, 
this connection between SOE and the Jewish community in Yugoslavia 
remains speculation.  
 
71 TNA PRO HS3/210, SO2/096, Bucharest, 9 Jan. 1941 XCG 70 and telegrams 
which immediately follow. 
69 TNA PRO HS3/206, SOE Palestine to CD from AD, 12  Mar. 1941, Athens. 72 TNA PRO FO371/29967 R7069/G, From Yugoslavia, Tel. No 559, Fortnightly 
Report, 14 Aug. 1940. 71 It was estimated that between 14-15,000 Jews entered Palestine illegally in 
1939. See FRUS, 1940, Vol. III, pp.832-4.  73 Amery, Autobiography, p.171. 
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important hindrance. Glanville in Zagreb, in particular, felt 
that this meant that the organisation was unable to counter the 
propaganda of the Croatian Peasant Party ‘on the rights and 
claims of Croatia (which) undoubtedly weakened the 
Yugoslav idea in Croatia’.74 Secondly, what comes through is 
the degree of improvisation and amateurish approach. In 
London, many members of the Foreign Office were intensely 
suspicious of SOE, ‘first of all as a joke, then as a menace.’75 
Thirdly, there are general file references to Yugoslav 
politicians, newspaper editors and contacts in the pay of 
several foreign powers.  
As the Southern Department appreciated, all the great 
powers were ‘devilling’ in Yugoslavia.76 In addition to 
Germany and Italy’s political and economic contacts and 
pressure on the Belgrade Government, Italy was concentrating 
on her imperial ambitions in Croatia and Dalmatia. Mussolini 
had provided long-standing support of Macedonian 
insurrectionists and the Ustashi. There was the advantage of 
Ante Pavelic, exiled in Italy. Mussolini had offered to fund 
Macek and his Croat Peasant Party before the Sporazum of 
August 1939). Jesuit priests were reportedly intriguing in 
Croatia against the central government in support of Pavelic, 
and in favour of Italy. There was also Italian support of the 
Francovici (essentially anti-Serb and pro-Axis), who had 
clandestine members in ‘many strategic posts in the 
administration of Croatia and at the Headquarters of the 
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CPP’.77 Germany sought to build up her own espionage 
network, through the German Tourist Office in Belgrade, and 
infiltration of the Croat community (in Army headquarters, at 
political and administrative level) in Zagreb; there was also 
the advantage of the sizeable German minority in Voivodina 
(approximately 450,000), the establishment of the Kulturebund 
as a focus of German organisation and propaganda, the 
research and investment of large sums of money into radio 
broadcasting to Yugoslavia, and transmission jamming; SIS 
and SOE in Zagreb were convinced that Germany engineered 
the assassination of the SOE agent, G. S. Frodsham, in 
September 1940.78 There was also the question of traditional  
French contacts within Yugoslav politics and commerce, now 
compromised by the defeat of France in June 1940 and the 
establishment of the Vichy government. Finally, although 
there are frequent references in the files to British appreciation 
of the importance of Russian attitudes and behaviour on Slav 
opinion,79 the documents do not show any awareness of 
Russian activity. In addition to the establishment of a Soviet 
mission in Belgrade following the commencement of 
diplomatic relations in May 1940 between Belgrade and 
Moscow, the Soviet Union was developing her own 
intelligence network (through left-wing journalists, 
 
77 TNA PRO HS5/912, Glen Report, 17 Nov. 1941. 
74 TNA PRO HS5/935, NERO Report. 78 Clissold Papers, MS Eng C.2683, D/H6 to AD, 5 June 1945: Note on the 
death of G. S. Frodsham. The British received regular information from Prince 
Paul, their own contacts with the Yugoslav police and authorities, and from 
within wider Yugoslav society. This information was passed on to the 
Yugoslav authorities. 
75 Gladwyn, Memoirs, p.103. 
76 TNA PRO FO371/24890 R6597/G, Clutton file note 12 June 1940. Hoptner 
concluded that whereas the prime concern for Yugoslavia in 1940 was Italian 
pressure, by early 1941 it proved a battle between Britain and Germany. 
Littlefield concentrated on Germany and Italy, and is dismissive of British 
activity. 
79 For example, TNA PRO FO371/30223 R173/G, Palairet, Athens to London, 
Tel. No. 30, 6 Jan. 1941. 
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newspaper editors, such as Vladislav Ribnikar, Director of 
Politika, and academics at the University of Belgrade).80 
 
SOE Activity and Tensions with the British Minister 
The lack of detailed co-ordination and outlook between 
Section D/SOE and the British Legation in Belgrade further 
conspired to limit British influence. Indeed, the tensions 
between Section D/SOE and the British Legation, particularly, 
the Minister, Campbell, point again to the inconsistencies and 
paradoxes of UK policy in Yugoslavia. Given the 
predominance in Yugoslavia of Serbs in government, 
administrative and military positions, it is not surprising that 
Britain focussed its attention primarily on the Serb section of 
the population. SOE’s concerted policy was designed to 
bolster the Serbian opposition, and to develop a united 
Serbian Front against any concessions to Germany and Italy.81 
All commentators have noted the subsidy offered to the 
Serbian Peasant Party, and the anglophile outlook and 
passionate anti-German views of its leader, Milan Gavrilovic 
(the Yugoslav representative in Moscow from June 1940), and 
Milos Tupanjanin, his Deputy.  
 SOE officials82 at the Legation were assiduous in 
developing their relationship with these politicians. Glen 
knew Milan Gavrilovic well, and regularly spent one 
afternoon a week visiting his wife and family in Belgrade after 
Gavrilovic’s departure to Moscow as Yugoslavia’s first 
                                                 
Ambassador to the Soviet Union. From July 1940 until the 
German invasion, Glen was ‘at least in daily contact with 
Tupanjanin and also in frequent touch with many of the 
leading politicians in the Serbian Peasant Party’.83 By March 
1941 SOE had also developed close links with the leaders of 
the Radical (Momcilo Nincic) and Democrat Parties (Dr Groll, 
Boka Vlaic and Dr Radjoe Knesevic). Also SOE established 
contact, initiated originally by Julian Amery, with Djonovic 
and the Yugoslav Nationalist party; but Amery’s successors 
perceived that political support for this organisation was 
‘limited to property-owning bourgeoisie and pensionaries of 
the Jeftic Government’ which was largely discredited.84  
Onslow: Belgrade Coup 
 30
                                                
 For Britain, the advantages of the Serbian Peasant 
Party were fourfold. Unlike the larger Radical and Democratic 
Parties (the largest Serbian political parties in Serbia, Bosnia 
and Montenegro), the SPP was represented in the Yugoslav 
Government, whereas the other Serbian parties stood 
determinedly aloof from Prince Paul’s regime. Thus, the SPP 
minister, Branko Cubrilovic, (and his allies – Mihailo 
Kostantinovic and Budisavlevic) through Tupanjanin, 
provided a valuable insight into the machinations of the 
Council. SOE also believed that unlike the other Serb 
Ministers – who were regarded as ‘merely yes-men willing to 
do the Prince’s bidding’ – as the SPP ministers represented a 
political party, this would increase these ministers’ influence 
in British attempts to modify and reverse the trend of the 
Regent’s foreign policy. Secondly, as SOE agents saw, they 
were able to collaborate with the British because of the 80 See Milovan Djilas: Memoirs of a Revolutionary, translated by Drenka Willen 
(New York, NY: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1973), and Gabriel Gorodetsky: 
Grand Delusion: Stalin and the German Invasion of Russia (Yale University Press, 
New Haven and London, 1999). Russian influence was inhibited by the 
Trotskyist struggle within the Moscow Soviet Party; and Comintern did not 
enjoy close relations with the Yugoslav Communist Party. Djilas, p.370. 
 
83 Confusingly, in his report, Glen refers to it as the Agrarian Party. TNA PRO 
HS5/921, Report by Lieutenant Commander Glen on his relations with the 
Yugoslavs, 17 Nov. 1941. 81 TNA PRO HS5/938, Weekly Report, 22 Oct. 1940. 
82 The SOE Officials were Alexander Glen, Julian Amery, and John Bennett. 84 Ibid. 
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‘greater immunity which they enjoyed as participants in the 
Cvetkovic Government.’85 
Thirdly, as the party representing a section of the 
Serbian peasantry – this class comprised 80 per cent of 
Yugoslavia – it possessed vital grass roots support in Bosnia 
and Montenegro, and the potential to appeal to the 
strategically important region of Old Serbia, should Prince 
Paul falter. The Serb Peasant Party also provided another 
conduit to Moscow, through Gavrilovic. And, finally, under 
Tupanjanin’s leadership, the Serbian Peasant party was also 
preparing for action in secret – another attraction as far as SOE 
was concerned (hence their advocacy of a subsidy from the 
UK in July 1940). As other commentators have pointed out, 
SOE’s contacts with the Serb community extended to the 
nationalist organisations’ leader, Ilija Trifunovic, well known 
as ‘a leader of men… and with great influence in all sections 
of Yugoslav life’.86 This represented potentially a very 
influential network throughout Serbia, some 200,000 strong, 
with associations in every Serbian town.  
 The combination of SOE sabotage activity, contacts 
with opponents of Prince Paul’s regime, the advocacy of 
funding and arming paramilitary organisations, and the 
proposal to fund a minority political party drove the tensions 
between SOE and the Legation into the open. In the literature 
occasional references appear to the British Minister in Sofia Sir 
George Rendel’s dislike of SOE operations in Bulgaria, and 
pointed contrasts are drawn to Ronald Campbell’s supposedly 
more relaxed approach to SOE activities in Yugoslavia. This is 
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an exaggeration. Campbell barely tolerated SOE activities; and 
at various points in the files there appear flares of irritation 
and dislike towards the ‘amateur assassins’ and their political 
naivety. Section D’s activities in Yugoslavia evolved 
piecemeal, and following the expulsion of Julius Hanau, 
Becker and Hudson in April 1940, there was an unhappy 
period when a quartet of Glen, Amery, Lawrenson and 
Glanville attempted to co-ordinate activities. Bill Bailey, head 
of SOE in Istanbul, later likened the atmosphere in Belgrade to 
that of ‘a bear garden’.87 SOE in Belgrade believed that it was 
‘clear that the Balkan countries are not an end in themselves to 
HMG, and their interests are subordinate to the intention of 
HMG to attempt to provoke a state of war between USSR and 
Germany’.88 This ran directly counter to Campbell’s 
conception of British policy.  
 The conflict between SOE and the Legation came to a 
head in August 1940. SOE schemes of blocking the Danube to 
German-bound freight had fizzled out in that summer, as they 
conflicted with the aims of other British Departments. It was 
argued in Belgrade that any attempt to block the Danube 
would have a ‘somewhat bad effect on Yugoslav military 
opinion, since they would feel that their last connection to the 
seas controlled by the Allies was gone’. Such schemes raised 
issues of major strategy: ‘the potential value of Yugoslavia as 
an ally against the possibility, the chance daily becoming more 
remote, of making an effective block in the Danube for the 
purpose of stopping the oil’.89 The parallel suggestion to 
subsidising the SPP, transmitted via the veteran politician and 
 
85 Ibid. 87 TNA PRO HS3/244, to DHS from DH2, Istanbul, 19 Sept. 1950. 
86 TNA PRO HS5/938, SOE Yugoslavia 99, Report to D/H2 from A/HG, 2 Aug. 
1940, Belgrade. The nationalist organisations comprised the Narodna Odbrana, 
the Chetniks, the Veterans Associations, the Order of the White Eagle with 
Swords, and other World War I resistance associations. 
88 TNA PRO HS5/938, AHA to HM Min., Belgrade, quoted in Report to D/H2 
from A/HG, Belgrade, 2 Aug. 1940. 
89 TNA PRO HS5/199, SOE (unsigned) to J. C. F. Holland, MI(R ), War Office, 
22 July 1940, SOE Danube River, No. 3. 
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journalist, Jovan Djonovic and Voivoda Ilija Trifunovic, was 
that the patriotic groups led by Narodna Odbrana, and the 
Serbian Church would support a coup d’état – and that leading 
members of the Serbian Peasant Party, important sections of 
the Army and the peasantry were sympathetic to such ideas.90 
Julian Amery was one of the principal contacts in this 
proposal which, it was hoped, would lead to the 
establishment of a pro-English-Russian-Government in 
Yugoslavia. The Ambassador’s outrage at the activities of 
SOE’s agents boiled over with the discovery of Amery’s 
unilateral mission to sound out leaders of the Bulgarian 
Peasant Party as to whether there would be the chance of co-
ordinated coup d’états in Sofia and Belgrade, followed by the 
establishment of a Balkan Front with the aim of setting up a 
pan-Slav federation and overt opposition to Germany.91  
Galvanised by the possibility of being inadvertently 
but actively involved in the overthrow of what he deemed to 
be the legitimate government – if necessary by violence – 
Campbell was stung into declaring that, while he would 
support a subsidy of up to £5,000 per month, he could not 
condone a coup d’état.92 In a flurry of telegrams, Campbell 
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begged London to put an end to such behaviour: ‘the whole 
thing [is] clumsy and amateurish’, and described Section D 
operatives as a collection of ‘bomb happy parvenus’, 
compromising official diplomatic channels with Prince Paul 
and the UK Government’s express policy of preserving 
‘peaceful conditions’ in Yugoslavia.93 This reflected 
Campbell’s fears that any action by Britain ‘might definitely 
provoke Germany to overrun Yugoslavia’.94  
The expressed policy of HMG is (a) to maintain 
the status quo in the Balkans and (b) to embroil 
Russia with Germany. I believe the two are 
dependent upon each other, and in fact the 
accomplishment of the first is essential to the 
successful timing of the second and more 
important.95 
The Foreign Office in London temporised, equally intent on 
their policy of embroiling Germany and Russia in eventual 
conflict via the Balkans, and painfully aware of the paucity of 
British aid that could be offered to a Yugoslav war effort 
should such an abrupt change of government precipitate a 
German attack. ‘It is by no means certain that the Chiefs of 
Staff would now recommend anything calculated to “set the 
Balkans in a blaze”.’ But London did not dismiss the idea out 
of hand: 
90 TNA PRO HS5/938, SOE Yugoslavia 99, Report to D/H2 from A/HG, 
Belgrade, 2 Aug. 1940; TNA PRO HS5/935, Tel. No. 482, Campbell, Belgrade 
to SOE London, 25 Jul. 1940. Apparently, not the acting leader, Tupanjanin, 
but Milan Gavrilovic was clearly sympathetic to such ideas; see HS5/827, 
Belgrade to Hopkinson, 30 Aug. 1940. 
91 The idea was certainly being considered (see TNA PRO HS5/872, C/D to 
Major Davis, 19 Sept. 1940) in SOE but a gloomy view was taken of the 
likelihood of Foreign Office support for such a notion at the moment. 
(manuscript note by P(hilip) B(road), 23 Sept. 1940). See also Amery, 
Autobiography, pp. 176-85. 
from ready to take the risk, and I presume HMG and the Turkish Government 
would view any such development with a certain amount of misgiving.’ TNA 
PRO FO371/24890 R6433/G, Campbell to London Tel. No. 443, 11 July 1940. 
92 TNA PRO HS5/938, Tel. No. 482, Campbell, Belgrade to SOE London, 25 
July 1941. Campbell had suggested the idea of the formation of a South Slav 
bloc, including Bulgaria, as a barrier against Germany and Italy, ‘in some 
degree associated with Russia.’ ‘But both the USSR and Yugoslavia seem far 
93 TNA PRO HS5/938, Tel. No. 494, Campbell, Belgrade, to London, 30 July 
1940, and Tel. No. 541, Campbell to London, 10 Sept. 1940. 
94 TNA PRO HS5/938, File note unsigned, 17 Aug. 1940. 
95 TNA PRO HS5/938, Memo by AHA to HM Min., Belgrade, 2 August 1940.  
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We cannot possibly give any support to these 
elements in Jugoslavia for the moment but we 
must be careful not to give them too much of a 
cold douche with the result that they do not come 
back to us later when the time is riper for an 
attempt of the kind discussed here.96 
However, growing pressure from Germany against British 
personnel ‘made establishment [of a] shadow organisation of 
immediate importance’. The subsidy of £4,000 was finally 
authorised in October 1940, with the stipulation that funds did 
not reach the SPP ‘through anyone connected with Legation.’97 
The consciences of the opponents at the British Legation and 
in London who opposed the notion of supporting a coup 
against Prince Paul, were soothed by SOE’s view that 
Tupanjanin and the Serbian Peasant party ‘had nothing 
whatever to do with the larger scheme’.98  
 Although London poured cold water on the notion of 
supporting a coup d’état in the summer, and again in the 
autumn of 1940 when the idea was mooted again by Serb 
dissidents, it was agreed that SOE’s aim of setting up and 
equipping resistance to the anticipated German occupation 
should be implemented. Campbell reluctantly agreed. The 
Legation remained acutely aware of the anomalies of this 
proposal of paying a subsidy to a political party and its 
supporting paramilitary organisation – and the potential for 
conflicting policies, which would place the Legation in an 
invidious position in its role as His Majesty’s representative to 
the recognised, neutral Yugoslav Government. The Minister 
was mollified by the recall of Amery to London, and the 
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appointment of Tom Masterson as SOE head in Belgrade in 
October 1940 – with the express instruction of reining in SOE 
enthusiasm, and concentrating on political work.99 However, 
the Minister remained deeply unhappy at the policy of 
equipping potential opponents of the Prince Regent (without 
his official knowledge). Regular consignments of detonators, 
explosives, fuses, limpets, wicks, knuckledusters, rifles and 
grenades were sent to Belgrade by courier from London and, 
from late 1940, from the British Military Mission in Athens.100 
These ‘toys and chocolate’, as they were coyly referred to in 
the telegrams, were stored in Masterson’s office in the 
Legation annex, before being distributed to Serb contacts and 
buried in arms caches in the hills. The intention was to build 
up a large resistance network in the countryside, together 
with specific plans for demolition and sabotage.101 
 Amery was to accuse London and the Legation of 
missing a golden opportunity in the summer/autumn of 1940 
in not being bold and supporting a coup.102 Glanville agreed 
 
99 As part of the reorganisation of Section D, Yugoslavia was brought under 
the remit of Istanbul Office. It was arranged that SOE Yugoslavia would be 
housed in a separate building from the British Legation, although the head of 
SOE station would be under diplomatic cover in the Legation. ‘Previously it 
was both expedient and desirable that the diplomatic missions in the various 
countries in which D was operating should know as little as possible about 
their activities. Now the position is radically changed, since it is obvious that 
HM Representatives must be fully advised of all political activities in their 
countries, even though these are to be carried out by agents not completely 
under their control.’ TNA PRO HS3/217, Most Secret, Memorandum on the 
Reorganisation of D Activities, Istanbul, 29 Nov. 1940. 
100 Sweet-Escott, pp.22-24. 
101 General Wavell, Commander-in-Chief, Middle East, took a great interest in 
these plans which he wished to supplement British intervention in Greece. See 
HS5/928, Report by Colonel Taylor and T S Masterson on Certain SO2 
Activities in Yugoslavia, undated.  
96 TNA PRO HS5/872, Philip Broad minute, 30 July 1940. TNA PRO HS5/872 
Belgrade to London, for D/HS from A/HG 19 Aug. 1940, Origin G8D CXG 32.  
97 TNA PRO HS5/872 A/HG to D/HS 23 July 1940. 
102 Amery, Autobiography, p.183. 98 TNA PRO HS5/872 Belgrade to Hopkinson, 30 Aug. 1940. 
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with him, that the opportunities of 1940 were squandered at a 
time when Yugoslavia’s strategic position was not so 
enfeebled. It has to be said that coup plots appear to have been 
endemic in Yugoslavia.103 General Simovic ‘had for some time 
been considered by elements hostile to the Government of the 
Prince Regent as a possible “sword” to further its 
ambitions.’104 He had been involved in two coup attempts in 
early 1938 (prompted by the question of the Concordat with 
the Vatican) and again in December 1938 after the General 
Election. In May 1940 three retired Serbian Generals, who 
represented one of the Army clubs, concocted a scheme in 
Zagreb to assassinate Prince Paul the following month.105 (SOE 
soon learned when members of the opposition made another 
approach to the General in October 1940, asking him to lead a 
coup d’état. The General’s answer was non-committal.)106 It 
was certainly evidence of the Minister’s and the Foreign 
Office’s caution; but given Britain’s diplomatic isolation and 
the threat of imminent invasion of Great Britain in 1940, it was 
seen, not unnaturally, as an unacceptably reckless gamble. 
Eden, both as Secretary of State for War, and from December 
1940, Foreign Secretary, set little store by SOE projects and 
proposals,107 and only turned to them in desperation in March 
1941. 
 Thus, the sum of British policy towards Yugoslavia 
appears to be fragmented and inconsistent, reflecting a lack of 
overall supervision and a failure of co-ordination and 
                                                 
cohesion – ultimately, a failure of leadership. In Yugoslavia, 
by the end of 1940, there was apparent concord of outlook 
between the various actors, but conflicting objectives and 
beliefs underpinned this. At best, an uneasy truce had been 
established between the British operating in Yugoslavia. 
Throughout the second half of 1940 SOE worked to build up a 
Serbian front among the Serbian opposition, with the Serbian 
Peasant Party the spearhead of their attack. SOE also 
concentrated efforts to develop relations with the Serbian 
Orthodox Church (although this organisation was officially 
outside politics) and those church leaders ‘who are working 
for Serb unity and resistance to German or Italian demands’. 
Although London was inclined to view optimistically 
apparent signs of Yugoslavia’s stiffening resolve against the 
Axis advance into the Balkans, SOE agents took an 
increasingly sceptical view of the value of Prince Paul to the 
British cause, and by December 1940, were reporting to 
Istanbul HQ that ‘there is a real possibility Prince Regent 
ultimately being obliged to play role analogous to King Carol’, 
and by implication ‘to ensure [Yugoslavia’s] entry into war if 
and when her government makes any dangerous concessions 
to Germany’.108  
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Yugoslavia at the Centre of British Strategic Planning 
As Barker has pointed out, the evolution of British policy 
towards Yugoslavia between early November 1940 and March 
1941 was driven by her concerns for her ally, Greece, and by 
the deteriorating situation in the Balkans.109 With the fall of 103 See Hoptner, pp.247-50. 
104 TNA PRO HS5/938, ‘Some notes on Yugoslav Politics since 27th March 
1941’, unsigned Report, 10 June 1941.  
105 TNA PRO HS5/935, NERO Report, 27 Sept. 1941 108 TNA PRO HS5/938, Memo AH10 to DH2 and DH/R, 9 Nov. 1940.   
106 TNA PRO HS5/938, ‘Some notes on Yugoslav Politics since 27th March 
1941’, unsigned Report, 10 June 1941. 
109 Barker, p.87. John Colville Diary, Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge, 
CLVL1/4, 12 Feb. 1941. Dill became convinced that the only way to stop the 
Balkans ‘being devoured piecemeal (was) to go to Greece with all that (Britain 
could) find as soon as it (could) be done. The risks are admittedly 
107 Papers of the 1st Earl of Avon, University of Birmingham Library [hereafter 
Avon Papers], Eden Diary, AP20/1/17-23 1937-1943, 15 Jan. 1941. 
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France in June 1940, Britain had nominally adopted the 
attitude of seeking to entangle Germany and the Soviet Union 
in the region, but in reality supported Prince Paul’s pursuit of 
neutrality to keep the Balkans quiet.110 Enigma decrypts from 
November 1940 onwards revealed that this was no longer a 
viable policy. Hence Britain changed tack from late 1940 to 
pressing Belgrade not to adhere to the Tripartite Pact; pursuit 
of neutrality was no longer enough.111 Therefore, UK policy 
towards Yugoslavia and ultimate support for the coup was 
defined by British strategic and power-political aims in the 
spring of 1941, and determination to resist the anticipated 
German attack on her ally, Greece – either through Bulgaria, 
or Yugoslavia.  
 The fragmentation and inconsistencies of British 
policy and activity in Yugoslavia, the inherent flaws versus the 
political expectations of British policy, came to repose in the 
new Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, who had his own 
particular agenda.112 In his critical biography of Eden, David 
Carlton attributes the resulting military fiasco in Greece to 
Eden’s own lack of critical judgement.113 Eden has been 
heavily criticised, both in the House of Commons on his 
return in April 1941, and by subsequent writers, for his role in 
the disastrous Greek campaign. Certainly, the Foreign 
Secretary was a politician who relied heavily upon his civil 
servants and, in his peripatetic tour of the Near East between 
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February and early-April, he was accompanied only by 
Pierson Dixon of the Southern Department, and Sir John Dill, 
the Chief of the Imperial General Staff. This naturally 
enhanced the importance of Eden’s own perceptions and 
decisions. While this policy of pursuing a Balkan front, and 
then endorsing a coup in Belgrade, was clearly a highly 
personal one for Eden, the Foreign Secretary was acting on 
Churchill’s instructions and was in close contact with the War 
Cabinet in London. Eden was in essence holding the ring 
between the Prime Minister – who desired to wear the 
Germans down in every theatre – and the Mediterranean 
Commanders-in-Chief who only reluctantly accepted the 
political arguments for the Greek campaign. Eden also had the 
vital backing of Jan Smuts, the South African Premier, who 
was present in Cairo at the crucial meetings between Eden, 
Dill, Wavell and his area commanders. Smuts’ endorsement of 
the political and diplomatic arguments for intervening in 
Greece, had a powerful influence upon both Churchill and 
Robert Menzies, the Australian Prime Minister.114 
 Overall, Eden’s ultimate decision to authorise UK 
involvement in a coup d’état against Prince Paul’s regime was 
to save Britain’s Greek venture, to bolster Turkey’s resolve 
against the German advance into the Balkans, and because of 
the associated perceived benefits in the United States, Vichy 
France, Spain and the Soviet Union.115 Yugoslavia was thus 
part of a complex pattern of elements that Britain was 
attempting to forge into a bulwark against German advance. 
‘The best way of ensuring that Turkey would fight would be 
to give effective help to the Greeks. If we failed in this, we 
should lose all hope of facing Germany with the Balkan front, 
                                                 
considerable but inaction would in my view be fatal.’ CIGS Sir John Dill 
message to Gen. Haining, VCIGS, quoted in Anthony Eden, The Eden Memoirs: 
Part Three, The Reckoning (London: Cassell, 1965), p.198. 
110 Hopes of transforming the Balkan Entente into a Balkan front had 
foundered on Bulgarian revanchism. 
111 Wheeler, p.29-30 
112 TNA PRO CAB 65/22 WM(41)27, Concl. Minute 6, 10 Mar. 1941. 114 TNA PRO CAB65/22 WM(41) 27 Concl. Minute 6, 10 Mar. 1941. 
113 See Carlton: Anthony Eden, A Biography (London: Allen & Unwin, 1981), 
p.170-82. 
115 John Colville Diary, Churchill Archives Centre, Cambridge, CLVL1/4, 12 
Feb. 1941. 
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we should probably lose our safe communications with 
Turkey, and we should lose Yugoslavia.’116 The problem now 
confronting London was to give diplomatic reality to these 
military and political decisions.  
 At the outset of his tour of the Near East, Eden was 
instructed by Churchill ‘to deal directly with the Yugoslav 
and Turkish Governments, with the object of making both 
countries fight at the same time or do the best they could’.117 
The Foreign Secretary’s mission was paralleled by SO2 
Deputy Director George Taylor’s tour of the Near East to 
establish post-occupational wireless networks and sabotage 
and resistance, to support the Commander-in-Chief, Middle 
East, General Wavell’s plans and General Wilson’s operations 
in Greece. 118 In Eden’s tour of the Near East from 22 February 
to 6 April 1941, the Foreign Secretary attempted to bring the 
wider world to bear upon Yugoslavia. In this, Eden adopted a 
four-fold approach. Initially the War Cabinet’s idea was to 
boost Yugoslavia’s resolve by aiding Greece. Failure to help 
Athens would mean ‘there is no hope of action by 
Yugoslavia’.119 This was Churchill’s view too.120 However, 
under Eden, this policy was turned on its head, and 
Yugoslavia and Turkey were to save Greece.121 Secondly, Eden 
sought to use Turkey as the means to draw Yugoslavia into 
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regional military planning and diplomatic defiance. The Chief 
of the Imperial General Staff, Sir John Dill, conceived Turkey 
as being more important strategically than Greece. 
‘Yugoslavia will not fight unless Turkey fights and the 
converse is very likely true.’122 Thirdly, Eden attempted to use 
American, Greek and Soviet channels to bolster Yugoslav 
resistance. And, fourthly, Britain was to exert pressure on 
Prince Paul’s Government to resist German pressure, and 
Italian enticement to join the Axis, using British diplomatic 
contacts, and SOE’s illicit network.  
 Through this complex policy, London hoped to revive 
the notion of ideas of a Balkan bloc.123 Through his own 
personal contacts and persuasion, the Legation staff in 
Belgrade, and the Washington and Moscow Embassies, Eden 
tried to draw the threads together. Prince Paul had already 
made abundantly clear his opposition to the idea of 
reinforcing Greece.124 Yet Eden was convinced that he could 
pull it off: ‘that Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia would all 
eventually come into the fight, but there would be would be a 
lot of slipping and slipping before that happens.’125 At the 
critical meeting at Tatoi on 23 February 1941 between Greece 
and British personnel, Yugoslavia inadvertently became the 
strategic epicentre of British plans in the Balkans. However, 
the importance General Papagos attached to the Yugoslav 
response to Greek and British overtures, combined with the 
Greek determination to defend Salonika, escaped both Eden 
116 Eden in Defence Committee (Operations) minutes, 10 Feb. 1941, quoted in 
Martin Gilbert (ed.) The War Papers of Winston Churchill: The Ever Widening 
War, Vol. III (London: Heinemann, 2000), p.200. 
 117 Eden Memoirs, p.193. See TNA PRO PREM3/294/1, for record of Eden’s 
mission. 122 Dill to Gen. Haining, VCIGS, quoted in Eden Memoirs, p.197.  
118 TNA PRO HS5/166, Report to Dalton from Taylor, Istanbul, 10 Feb. 1941, 
and Dalton/Taylor, Athens, 11 Mar. 1941. 
123 These had been circulating since April 1939. Britain originally had hoped to 
use this to underpin Balkan neutrality, and had firmly opposed French ideas 
of opening a Salonika front 1939-40. See Barker, pp.11-20. 119 Eden Memoirs, p.197 
120 Churchill to Ismay, for Chiefs of Staff Committee, 7 Jan.1941, quoted in 
Gilbert, p. 43-44.  
124 TNA PRO FO371/30089 R278/G, Campbell to London, Tel. No. 61, 12 Jan. 
1941. 
125 FRUS Vol. II, 1941, Min. in Greece to Secretary of State, 2 Mar. 1941, p. 654. 121 See Wheeler, p.33. 
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and Dill. Only in the final stages did Yugoslavia become the 
prime focus of British attentions – that is, after the failure of 
Eden’s mission to Turkey, Bulgaria’s accession to the 
Tripartite Pact on 1 March, and the awful realisation on 5 
March 1941 that the Greeks had not withdrawn to the 
Aliakmon line as Eden and Dill had anticipated.126 Thereafter, 
British policy became a desperate race prevent Yugoslavia’s 
signature of the Tripartite Pact to protect Britain’s exposed 
flank in Greece, comprising Commonwealth troops (from 
Australia and New Zealand, which was politically very 
sensitive in itself, given the theatre of war.)127 
 Eden stressed repeatedly – in his memoirs, in 
correspondence with Churchill, and in telegrams to London – 
that Turkey was the key to the whole Balkan situation, and 
did his best to promote a Balkan bloc to withstand Germany’s 
advance.128 At the UK’s instigation – through the Southern 
Department, the Ankara Legation, and then the Foreign 
Secretary – in mid-January and early-February there had 
ensued an elaborate dance between Yugoslavia and Turkey, as 
British diplomats and the military painstakingly attempted to 
nudge Turkey and Yugoslavia closer together.129 The bait 
offered to each side was that a German threat to Salonika 
would constitute a casus belli for the other: but neither 
Belgrade nor Ankara responded. The Southern Department 
fumed over the ‘typical Balkan muddle’ of the 
misunderstanding of instructions despatched to the Turkish 
                                                 
Ambassador in Belgrade and his demarche to the Yugoslav 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs.130 However, the plan for concerted 
action between Turkey and Yugoslavia remained ‘a most 
important part of [British] policy in the Balkans.’131 Eden 
attempted again by direct discussions with the Turkish 
Foreign Minister in Ankara at the end of February 1941 – his 
‘jaunty telegram’ enraged the War Cabinet, as there was 
clearly no substance underpinning his hopes of Turkish 
action.132 The Legation and military staff in Angora were 
profoundly dubious about Eden’s policy, and their 
Government’s attempts ‘to hustle the Turks faster than their 
temperamental and technological situations would justify’.133 
On 18 March Eden tried again at a meeting with Cyprus with 
Sarajoglu, the Turkish Foreign Minister, and Greek 
representatives. He finally managed to extract the statement 
that an attack on Salonika would constitute a ‘mortal danger’ 
(but not the desired ‘casus belli’) for Turkey; as he telegraphed 
Campbell in Belgrade, this was the best he could do.134 To the 
immense frustration of the Foreign Secretary, the Turkish 
Government subsequently refused to send new instructions to 
their Belgrade minister because of the Cabinet crisis in 
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130 TNA PRO FO371/30231 R557/G, R. Bowker file note, 29 Jan. 1941. See 
R685/G for summary of exchange of telegrams and hesitant response of 
Angora and Belgrade. The American Ambassador in Angora reported that the 
Germans had broken the Turkish diplomatic codes and speculated that the 
instructions from Angora to the Turkish Mission in Belgrade had been 
distorted. FRUS, 1941, Vol. III, Ambassador MacMurray to Secretary of State, 
21 Mar. 1941, p.835. 126 TNA PRO PREM3/309, Athens to Foreign Office, Tel. No. 313, from 
Secretary. of State and CIGS for Churchill, 5 Mar. 1941. 131 TNA PRO FO371/30231 RR685/G, Clutton file note, 4 Feb. 1941. 
134 The Diaries of Sir Alexander Cadogan 1938-1945, ed. David Dilks (Cassell, 
London 1971), 28 Feb. 1941, p.359. 
127 Churchill to Eden, 5 Mar. 1941, quoted in Gilbert, p.311. 
128 Eden Diary entry 29 Jan. 1941, quoted in Eden Diaries, p.188. Also 
AP/20/8/406, Eden to Churchill, 8 Feb. 1941. 133 FRUS, 1941, Vol. III, Ambassador MacMurray, Angora, to Secretary of 
State, 25 Feb. 1941, p.825. 129 TNA PRO FO371/29802 R1995/G, Orme Sargent minute, 24 Feb. 1941 
(summarising HMG efforts to induce Turkey and Yugoslavia to enter the war 
on Britain’s side.) 
134 TNA PRO FO371/30231, R2893/G, Eden, Angora, to Belgrade,  Tel. No. 150, 
23 Mar. 1941.  
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Yugoslavia – precipitated by the resignation of three Serb 
politicians on 20 March. (It is ironic that this was the work of 
SOE in close co-ordination with Tupanjanin.).135 
 Eden and London had much more success co-
ordinating their Balkan policy, and consequent pressure on 
Prince Paul’s regime, with the Roosevelt Administration. 
Historians have pointed in general terms to the ‘common law 
marriage’ that developed between the United States and 
Britain following the offer of Lend Lease in December 1940. 
Yugoslavia was one of the first manifestations of the evolving 
partnership. Therefore, those historians such as Mark 
Wheeler, who concentrate exclusively on the London/Belgrade 
angle, miss the vital dimension of British policy towards 
Yugoslavia, and indeed the Balkans as a whole. Building upon 
Colonel Donovan’s tour of the Balkans,136 and Harry 
Hopkins’s extended visit to London,137 there was increasing 
co-ordination of policy and diplomatic activity with the 
United States.138 Eden attempted to use American diplomatic 
                                                 
Onslow: Belgrade Coup 
 46
                                                                                             
support and pressure upon both Turkey and Yugoslavia. He 
also approached the American Ambassadors in both capitals 
to request that the State Department in Washington try and 
persuade the President to offer Lend-Lease material to each, 
rather than channelling it through Britain.139 Eden was 
earnestly hoping that Turkey would realise that ‘American 
industry would tip the balance in the war.’140 The American 
Secretary of State, Cordell Hull, had already instructed the 
American Minister in Belgrade, Arthur Bliss Lane, to 
emphasise to the Belgrade Government ‘the position of the 
United States … with regard to the present European conflict. 
Particular emphasis is laid on American aid to Great Britain 
and Greece.’141 London continued to urge Washington to 
encourage Turkey and Yugoslavia ‘to work together in 
resisting outside aggression.’142 This had the wholehearted 
support of Lane, who used all opportunities to reinforce the 
message; the lure of American support for post-war political 
and geographical readjustments was extended.143 Eden met 
Colonel William Donovan on 20 February 1941 and asked him 
to convey a message to Roosevelt requesting help with British 
135 FRUS, 1941, Vol. III, Ambassador MacMurray to Secretary of State, 25 Mar. 
1941, p.837. See TNA PRO FO371/30231 R2937/G, Philip Nichols file note, 24 
Mar. 1941. 
136 See entire file TNA PRO FO371/29292 ‘Colonel Donovan’s Visit’. Donovan 
stayed at the British Legation in Athens at the same time as General Wavell in 
Jan. 1941, and ‘was able to have a first hand account of the negotiations with 
the Greek Government from the Commander in Chief’. (Palairet, Athens to 
London, Tel No 2 Saving, 18 Feb. 1941). On 6 Feb. Donovan raised the issue 
with Eden of what action Pres. Roosevelt could take to assist British 
diplomacy in the Balkans. (Avon Papers: AP/20/8/407 and 407A, Eden to 
Churchill, 8 Feb. 1941.) Donovan also sat in conference with Eden, Dill and 
Wavell in Cairo on 20 Feb. 1941 See Bradley Smith: The Shadow Warriors: the 
OSS and the Origins of the CIA (New York, NY: Basic, 1983), pp. 48-51.   
Immediate HP/MS/4502 Cipher 5/2 Secret, Personal from GIGS from Colonel 
Dykes. Dykes was the British officer accompanying Donovan on his tour. 
139 TNA PRO FO371/29792 R1005/G, Eden to Churchill, 8 Feb. 1941; FRUS, 
1941, Vol. II, British Embassy to Department of State, Aide Memoire, 4 Feb. 
1941 p.940; Vol. III, Memorandum of Conversation by Secretary of State, 3 
Mar. 1941. p.828. 
140 FRUS 1941, Vol. III, Ambassador in Turkey to Secretary of State, 27 Feb. 
1941, p.826. 
141 FRUS 1941, Vol. II, Secretary of State to Minister in Yugoslavia, 29 Jan. 
1941, p.940. 
137 See Robert E. Sherwood: The White House Papers of Harry L. Hopkins, Vol. 1 
Sept. 1939-January 1942 (London: Eyre & Spottiswoode, 1948), pp.231-63. 
142 FRUS 1941, Vol. II, Memorandum of Conversation by Secretary of State, 5 
Feb. 1941, p.941. 
143 FRUS 1941, Vol. II, Minister in Yugoslavia to Secretary of State, 11 Feb. 
1941, p.943. 
138 See entire file TNA PRO FO/371/29792 ‘Colonel Donovan’s visit’; and 
FO371/29795, R1005/G, GOC, Palestine and Transjordan, to War Office, 
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overstrained shipping resources in the Mediterranean.144 
Churchill similarly pressed Roosevelt, when informing him of 
Britain’s decision to aid Greece: 
At this juncture the action of Yugoslavia is 
cardinal. No country ever had such a military 
chance. If they will fall on the Italian rear in 
Albania there is no measuring what might happen 
in a few weeks. The whole situation might be 
transformed, and the action of Turkey also 
decided in our favour. One has the feeling that 
Russia, though actuated mainly by fear, might at 
least give some reassurance to Turkey about not 
pressing her in the Caucasus or turning against 
her in the Black Sea. I need scarcely say that the 
concerted influence of your Ambassadors in 
Turkey, Russia, and above all Yugoslavia, would 
be of enormous value at the moment, and indeed 
might possibly turn the scales.145 
Similarly, there was close co-ordination of policy with 
Lord Halifax, Ambassador in Washington, and the US State 
Department. Both the Foreign Office and the US Treasury 
Department were disturbed by Yugoslavia’s request to 
transfer her financial holdings – both London and Washington 
wished to prevent these funds from being transferred ‘out of 
reach’, to Brazil.146 As Yugoslavia’s acceptance of the Tripartite 
Pact seemed imminent, Halifax was instructed to get the 
American Government ‘if possible to send further instructions 
to their Minister in Belgrade with a view, inter alia, to ensuring 
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that if Yugoslavia signs anything that instrument shall include 
an assurance by Germany that she will not attack Salonika.’147 
The US State Department responded by instructing the 
American Minister in Belgrade to inform the Yugoslav 
Government that ‘the US Government would freeze all 
Yugoslav assets should Yugoslavia make any agreement with 
Germany which affected Yugoslavia’s independence’, gave 
military facilities to Germany, or affected the security of 
British military forces.148 The BBC monitored Serb radio 
broadcasts in the US, and highlighted them on the BBC.149 
However, there was not complete unity of approach between 
London and Washington. Disappointingly for Britain, this 
American support did not extend to suggesting Yugoslavia 
take offensive action. Similarly, American offers of support 
remained deliberately vague – promises of material and moral 
support to maintain her independence, rather than the specific 
offer of armaments from American production. America 
looked to Britain to promise to lend ‘material military aid with 
air force and ground force’.150 And, once the Yugoslav 
Government had offered assurances about her policy towards 
Germany and the stiffening of Belgrade’s attitude against 
German pressure, Washington permitted the transfer of half 
the Yugoslav Government funds held in the USA.151 However, 
American diplomats on the spot did what they could to lend 
Britain all possible moral support. During the final frenetic 
 
147 TNA PRO FO371/30253 R2778/G, File Note by Philip Nichols, 21 Mar. 1941. 
148 TNA PRO FO 371/30253 R2824/G, Campbell, Belgrade, for Secretary of 
State, Tel No 654, 21 Mar. 1941.   
149 BBC WAC E2/186/4, Note 188, BBC Monthly Intelligence Report, 21 Jan. 
1941. 144 Eden Dairies, p.195l. 
145 FRUS 1941, Vol. II, Churchill to Roosevelt, 10 Mar. 1941, p.951. 150 FRUS 1941, Vol. II, Secretary of State to Roosevelt, 12 Mar. 1941, p.953. 
146 FRUS 1941, Vol. II, Sec of  State to Minister in Yugoslavia, 15 Mar. 1941. 
Eden Diary, AP20/1/1-24 – AP/3/1-11 Pocket Diaries 1921-1976, entry 17 Mar. 
1941, AP20/3/2, Greece. 
151 TNA PRO FO371/29781 R2681/G, From Halifax, Special to Eden , Tel. No. 
1205, repeated to Cairo and Belgrade, 18 Mar. 1941. The original sum 
mentioned had been US$29m. 
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days in the lead up to the coup, to London’s immense 
satisfaction, Halifax reported that America was putting ‘all the 
pressure they could upon Jugoslavia in the same direction as 
ourselves, but that [they] would certainly consider if they 
could do more’.152 Campbell saw Lane at least once a day and 
the two exchanged information and co-ordinated their 
diplomatic approaches and pressure on the President of the 
Council and Government. The Americans in Belgrade were 
also aware of the extent of British subversive activities in the 
Balkans. After the abrupt departure of the British Legation on 
12 April 1941, the American Consul in Belgrade, Rankin, 
visited the Legation Annex to ensure that all the ‘toys and 
chocolate’ had been removed.153 
 This marked (if not total) British success in co-
ordinating policy and diplomatic pressure in the Balkans, and 
on Yugoslavia in particular, with the Americans was in direct 
contrast to UK’s efforts to recruit the Soviet Union. It was 
initially hoped that ‘the best way of gaining Russia is a good 
throw in the Balkans’.154 As well as trying to cajole the Soviets 
into a stout declaration of support for Yugoslavia (Sir Stafford 
Cripps and Gavrilovic co-ordinated their activity in Moscow), 
London was also pressing the Soviet Union to give a formal 
assurance that it would not attack Turkey in the event of a 
German attack.155 The Soviet Union finally announced this 
formally on 19 March. However, British hopes that the USSR 
could make good Yugoslavia’s armaments deficiencies came 
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to nothing. The Soviets refused to be drawn into a 
commitment to support the neutrality and independence of 
the Balkan states. 
 Finally, there is the bilateral relationship and the 
pressure that Britain sought to exert on Prince Paul, and Prime 
Minister Cvetkovic between January and March 1941. 
Wheeler, Stafford and Barker have all reviewed this, pointing 
to the established method of monarchical missives, and visits 
from trusted British friends (such as Henry ‘Chips’ 
Channon).156 As Yugoslavia’s decision seemed to hang in the 
balance, there were repeated requests for audiences and 
increasingly frenetic messages from Eden; the despatch of 
Terence Shone, the former First Secretary at the Belgrade 
Legation and a close friend of the Prince Regent; Churchill’s 
personal appeal to the President of the Council, Cvetkovic; 
exhortations from the Minister, Campbell; offers to consider 
Yugoslavia’s ethnographic claim to the Istrian Isthmus and 
islands in Adriatic in the post-war peace settlement. (Britain 
did not think it necessary to tell the Americans that this had 
been proposed.)157 Official diplomatic channels were backed 
by SOE efforts to orchestrate particularly Serbian 
dissatisfaction with the pro-German drift of the Regent’s 
Government, through nationalist petitions, co-ordinating the 
resignation of three Serb ministers with Tupanjanin; and 
increased broadcasts by the BBC designed to bring ‘all 
possible pressure’ to bear in the Serb-Croat programmes,158 
 
152 TNA PRO FO371/30253 R2802/G, Halifax to London,  Tel No. 1272, 21 Mar. 
1941. 
156 Although R. A. Butler’s (Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State at the 
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SOE’s activities in the country. TNA PRO FO371/24892 R8860/G, Sir G. 
Thomas to Broad, Ministry of Economic Warfare, PJD 23 Dec. 1940. 
153 See TNA PRO HS5/912, Tel. GCB SO2/004 to ACSS only, Cipher Telegram 
from Istanbul, Immediate, 19 Sept. 1941. 
154 Churchill to Eden, 23 Feb. 1941, quoted in Gilbert, p.255. 
155 FRUS, 1941, Vol. III, Ambassador MacMurray to Secretary of State, Ankara, 
19 Mar. 1941, p.832. 
157 TNA PRO FO371/30240 R1949/G, Cadogan to Churchill, 28 Feb. 1941. 
158 TNA PRO FO371/30253 R2916/G, Nichols, 24 Mar. 1941. 
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which culminated in Leo Amery’s call to Serbian resistance on 
26 March – attributed mistakenly by his colleagues to tipping 
the balance.159 
 None of this co-ordinated diplomatic activity and 
pressure succeeded in preventing the Yugoslav Government’s 
signature of the Tripartite Pact on 25 March 1941. The Foreign 
Secretary’s decision to agree to a coup in March therefore 
marked the failure in the Foreign Office’s and the British 
Legation’s preferred approach of reliance upon Prince Paul to 
‘do the right thing’. This had been perceived as Britain’s 
trump card in Yugoslavia since 1939. It is clear that 
Tupanjanin had believed that the resignation of three political 
allies, and the ensuing Cabinet crisis, would either precipitate 
the fall of the government, or a radical change of foreign 
policy. This did not happen, and the Turkish Government, 
much to Eden’s frustration, used the political crisis in 
Belgrade as the excuse not to make a new approach to 
Yugoslavia: the Turkish Ambassador in Belgrade was 
instructed to act only ‘if he finds the occasion suitable.’160  
 The diplomats’ faith in Prince Paul died hard: even 
after the meeting between SOE, SIS and Legation staff on 19 
March (which has been pointed to by historians as the crucial 
point whereat diplomats and British personnel on the spot 
looked to the formation of an alternative government), the 
following day Campbell was recommending to Eden that all 
should be done to minimise the importance of the Pact, if 
Yugoslavia signed, ‘and to keep the Yugoslavs in play’.161 
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Eden’s telegram to Belgrade on 24 March urging the Minister 
to point out that Prince Paul could still step back from the 
brink, demonstrates the Foreign Secretary’s preference, since 
on 22 March he had given the Belgrade Legation authority to 
pursue all means possible, including a coup d’état.162 Now 
SOE/SIS contacts were perceived to be an alternative card 
(Eden was particularly fond of bridge analogies), but an 
uncertain one. Eden himself was very sceptical about Dalton’s 
organisation and its schemes: Southern Department in the 
Foreign Office in London163 – and Eden, judging by the tone of 
his frenetic telegrams from Cairo164 – did not believe the coup 
could be pulled off. The earnest hope was that a new 
Yugoslav government, either a civilian one (which was 
expected to be overwhelmingly, if not exclusively, Serb), 
dominated by the military, or – preferably – an authoritarian 
regime, would reject Prince Paul and his Government’s 
defeatist posture and adherence to the Tripartite Pact, and go 
on the offensive in Albania. But the Foreign Office was very 
pessimistic about the chances of success; Tupanjanin’s positive 
reports had been repeatedly discounted on the grounds that 
he and his party were financed by Britain.165 Southern 
Department was already devoting considerable thought of 
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how best to manage Yugoslavia’s adherence to the Tripartite 
Pact: either by maintaining relations with Prince Paul’s 
Government, or by seeking to foster a separatist regime in 
southern Serbia with the support of the strategically key 
Southern Serb Army. The British Minister in Athens, Sir 
Michael Palairet, had already been instructed to co-operate 
with General Papagos in a joint effort to ‘bring about the 
secession of the Yugoslav Southern Army.’166 There was no 
contingency planning for the actual outcome of the coup: 
namely, a military figurehead and a government of national 
unity based on all political parties. 
 Historians have made great play of the fact that 
Britain ignored the fact that Yugoslavia signed the Tripartite 
Pact on 25 March without the military clauses. However, the 
documents made it abundantly clear that for London the 
prime importance of Yugoslavia’s continued resistance to 
joining the Axis was the uncertainty that this was believed it 
would engender. No reliance could be placed upon 
Germany’s word – something with which Prince Paul 
agreed.167 Image therefore was all: Yugoslavia was the last 
remaining neutral on the frontiers of the Reich, and there was 
the strategic importance of proximity to the Struma Valley 
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(the invasion route through Bulgaria to Greece); the Monastir 
and Vardar gaps within Yugoslavia itself offered the shorter 
route to attack Britain’s ally.168 Similarly, those historians who 
introduce a value judgement into their analysis of British 
policy – that it was irresponsible, cynical, asked too much of 
Yugoslavia – are arguing from a flawed hypothesis.169 
Naturally, the United Kingdom, as an imperial great power, in 
the grip of total war against fascism, looked to her own 
national interests and was guided by her own geostrategic 
imperatives. The fundamental flaw in this policy, from the 
point of view of the successful achievement of British aims in, 
and through Yugoslavia, therefore is that policy was dictated 
by London’s political preoccupations and Britain’s wider 
strategic imperatives, with insufficient attention to the local 
Yugoslav dynamic. That the UK entertained expectations 
before the coup, only to have these rudely disabused, was a 
product of the great power mindset of the London political 
and bureaucratic elite. 
 Given lack of British investment in Yugoslavia in 
terms of arms, war material, economic links and broader 
political ties, the immediate success of the coup – as a striking 
gesture of defiance against Nazi Germany – should be seen as 
a fortunate coincidence of UK strategic imperatives and 
Yugoslav (predominantly, but not exclusively, Serb) domestic 
and international concerns. Britain’s support was borne of her 
desperate attempts to salvage something from the wreckage of 
her Balkan policy: failure to equip Balkan states with sufficient 
arms and consequent confidence to withstand German 
pressure; failure to establish any sort of economic and 
financial leverage in Yugoslavia, in part because of the 
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fixation of the Ministry of Economic Warfare with the efficacy 
of economic blockade; failure to broker a Balkan front against 
Germany’s relentless advance; failure to reinforce adequately 
and in good time their ally, Greece; failure to persuade Russia 
to come to the aid of fellow Slavs. For Britain the aftermath of 
the March coup proved a bitter irony: it was the triumph of 
Yugoslav democracy, whereas the immediate interests of 
democratic Britain would have been better served by an 
authoritarian separatist regime in Southern Serbia – one of the 
options the Foreign Office was contemplating. In part British 
policy and inflated expectations were to blame for the coup 
‘misfiring’: SOE’s attempts to co-ordinate Serb opposition to 
the foreign policy of Prince Paul’s Government ran into the 
realities of Yugoslav/Serbian politics. The Serbian Peasant 
Party challenged the economically powerful interest groups 
and established Serbian political parties, the Radicals and the 
Democrats. The SPP’s foreign policy agenda was more overtly 
pan-Slav and anti-German, than these larger parties, and there 
appears no awareness or assessment in the British files of the 
extent to which the SPP were using British political 
encouragement and financial aid for their own ends. Nor was 
SOE apparently aware that Tupanjanin was also on the Soviet 
NKVD payroll.170 In addition, SOE’s policy of reliance and 
support upon the small Serbian Peasant Party severely 
irritated these other Serbian political groups. SOE in Belgrade 
warned that Tupanjanin was regarded with suspicion because 
of the SPP participation in the Regent’s Government and 
‘probably on the grounds of being too close to the Prince 
Regent.’171 The fact that they had not been the recipients of 
British largesse was another source of grievance among other 
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Opposition politicians.172 General Simovic had originally 
intended to form an authoritarian government but, within 
hours of the successful overthrow of the Regent’s 
Government, was persuaded by Radnoje Knesevic (a fervent 
Serb nationalist and leading Democratic Party politician who 
was in close touch with SOE) to form a multi-party 
government, which included the Croat Peasant Party, to 
ensure Yugoslavia’s continued cohesion.173 After the events of 
27 March, the Southern Department complained that the coup 
had been hijacked, and Campbell lamented the reappearance 
of yesterday’s men, but there was no appreciation of the 
extent to which British policy had contributed to this outcome. 
 The immediate image of the coup was a triumphant 
rejection of the Axis. Certainly, unlike in every other Balkan 
country which had succumbed to German pressure, Britain 
did contribute to a flare of defiance against fascism. However, 
this should not detract from the reality of the outcome of the 
coup as a defeat for British policy. British policy had been hoist 
on its own petard in using a minority Serbian party, to further 
London’s ambitions. Therefore the ‘detonator concept’174 on 
which London (and Dalton) had pinned so much, was 
revealed to be unstable ordnance. The fact that the coup 
‘misfired’ revealed the limits of British contacts within 
broader Yugoslav society – in part a product of the legacy of 
the1930s, also of the conscious political decision to focus on 
Belgrade, and failure to build up contacts within wider 
                                                 
172 TNA PRO FO371/30243 R3210/G, Athens to London , Tel No. 519, 26 Mar. 
1941. The British Minister’s source was the King of Greece, Prince Paul’s 
brother-in-law, and to whom the Regent had been speaking daily and at 
length since Jan. 1941 (over an insecure land line, much to the horror of British 
diplomats). 
173 TNA PRO HS5/938 ‘The Coup d’état in Yugoslavia, Belgrade 27 March 
1941’, Report by ‘Daddy’ (Trifunovic), and Report by D/HY (Masterson).  170 Gorodetsky: Grand Delusion, p.139. 
174 Stafford, Britain and European Resistance, p.29-49. 171 TNA PRO HS5/938, Weekly report AH/G to DH2, 22 Oct. 1940.  
 55
eJournal of International History (March 2005) 
Yugoslav political society. Thus London’s political 
expectations had been attached to unstable local factors.  
 
Conclusions 
This article has sought to point to an alternative interpretation 
to British policy towards Yugoslavia, leading up to the events 
of 27 March 1941, underlining the inconsistencies of policy 
making in London, expanding upon the SOE angle and to 
highlight the tensions between British actors in Yugoslavia, 
and placing the coup in its broader context of Eden’s vain 
pursuit of a Balkan front. Archival material, not available to 
historians such as Barker or Wheeler, reveals a more nuanced 
picture of the extent to which British policy makers were 
working at cross purposes in Yugoslavia. Britain was at 
considerable disadvantage in terms of Yugoslavia’s strategic 
isolation, gradual encirclement post June 1940 by Axis 
powers, the legacy of the interwar period and lack of 
economic ties. However, important political choices were also 
made, with inherent contradictions, and which were to have 
important consequences for British policy objectives in the 
Second World War. In the trenchant words of Terence 
Glanville, in Yugoslavia’s defeat in April 1941, Britain paid the 
price of her appeasement of Germany politically and 
commercially in the 1930s, in her lack of influence in 
Yugoslavia and failure to establish sound links with the 
Croatian political community, the minute proportion of trade 
between the two countries, and her inability to remedy the 
glaring deficiencies of the Yugoslav military in the early 
1940s.175  
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